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Chapter I 
Introduction: Global Studies, International Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
One of the key players in this contemporary era of globalization has been the United States of 
America, which means that U.S. foreign policy can have a tremendous impact across the globe in 
a way that the foreign policies of many other states simply cannot.  This is not to say that other 
countries do not matter, they most certainly do—in fact, this essay will highlight how important 
they are in an era of global interconnectedness—but clearly, an understanding of U.S. foreign 
policy can go a long way in explaining some of the most important developments within the 
contemporary international community.  Given the structure of the U.S. government, a 
discussion about foreign policy will almost always involve the U.S. President, who has much 
more control over foreign policy than domestic policy, which is shared to a greater extent with 
the U.S. Congress and the state governments, including local governors and legislators.  Thus, 
when trying to understand U.S. foreign policy, the presidency is a good place to start.  This essay 
will specifically explore the foreign policy initiatives of U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy 
Carter, including the sometimes contradictory nature of their rhetoric, in order to develop a 
clearer understanding of the theoretical basis of U.S. foreign policy. 
 In this essay, U.S. foreign policy will be placed within the greater context of global 
studies.  As such, it will not look at U.S. foreign policy simply for the sake of doing so, but rather 
to see how it is connected to global affairs; this will immediately remove from the table many 
domestically oriented topics of international relations and U.S. foreign policy studies, such as the 
checks and balances between the congress and the presidency regarding foreign affairs and the 
bureaucratic distribution of power among internationally-focused government departments and 
agencies.  However, this essay will specifically address philosophies and theories that dominate 
the understanding of global affairs in Washington, D. C.  More specifically, this essay will address 
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the two primary schools of thought regarding foreign policy in the United States: realism, often 
paired with its philosophical twin realpolitik, and liberal internationalism, the global application 
of liberal philosophy.  Although there are certainly other theories used to explain international 
events and to create foreign policies, these typically fail to escape from university classrooms and 
libraries in the United States.  Despite the sharp philosophical distinctions between the two 
paradigms, their application in the real world tends to be quite fuzzy.  The majority of the public 
political discourse is rooted in either realism or liberalism, or some sort of combination of the 
two.  From this dynamic, a typical question emerges: Which theoretical framework provides the 
best understanding of the United States’ foreign policy?  Or to put it differently, which provides 
the clearest explanation of how the United States views its place within the international 
community?  This question seems fairly straightforward.  One might think it would be relatively 
easy to identify which paradigm of theories is dominant, but no quick analysis of Richard Nixon 
or Jimmy Carter can indicate accurately which paradigm formed the foundation of their 
understanding of the United States’ position and role in the world.  Contradictions abound in the 
foreign policies and rhetoric of both Nixon and Carter. 
Primarily two phenomena have inspired the creation of this essay.  The first is that of the 
relationship between the United States of America and the rest of the world.  The relatively quick 
ascent of the United States from a small, isolated, agricultural society—comprised primarily of 
pious outcasts from Europe and some African slaves—to the world’s leading superpower 
through a rapid industrialization process and victories in global wars, both hot and cold, was a 
significant turning point in global history.  Because of its power, the United States, along with its 
allies, has played a crucial role in the development of the current global community.  Thus, 
understanding how U.S. leaders and policy makers view the world helps one understand not only 
how the United States designs its foreign policies, but also how the U.S. interacts with the global 
community through the process known as globalization.  The effect of U.S. foreign policy is felt 
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throughout the world and any alteration to U.S. grand strategy could have a profound impact 
upon the process of globalization. 
The second primary phenomenon that has inspired this essay was the recent election of a 
presidential candidate who, in addition to being the first candidate to campaign for the 
presidency outside the United States, also based his candidacy on the promise of hope and change 
and the corresponding lofty rhetoric of triumphal liberal idealism.  Although these themes were 
largely directed towards domestic policy issues, they were also specifically linked to U.S. foreign 
policy, especially policies dealing with the military base at Guantanamo Bay, the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the relationships with the Muslim world, Israel and Russia.  However, Barack 
Obama was certainly not the first presidential candidate to inspire hope and promise change in 
U.S. foreign policy; both Nixon and Carter did the same, as the following case studies will 
indicate.  In sharp contrast to the grandiloquent promises of change, this essay will ultimately 
demonstrate that there is remarkable consistency in U.S. foreign policy because of its consistent 
philosophical understanding of global affairs, despite what candidates promise on the campaign 
trail and what presidents say from the Oval Office. 
It is often easier to understand contemporary events with the perspective of time, thus, 
this essay will deal with neither the current president, nor his immediate predecessors.  
Undoubtedly they will be the subjects of future scrutiny.1  Instead, this essay will focus upon U.S. 
Presidents Richard Nixon (1969-74) and Jimmy Carter (1977-81) largely because of their 
supposedly vastly different approaches to foreign policy.  The purpose of this essay is not to 
specifically address the foreign policies of these presidents per se, but rather to take a step back: 
to look at the bigger picture; to evaluate the philosophical context and its influence on policy 
matters; and to place U.S. foreign policy within the broader scope of global studies.  Specifically, 
the two aforementioned presidents will serve as case studies in an analysis of how to best explain 
U.S. foreign policy and the consistency of its inconsistent rhetoric. 
                                                 
1 For an example of this development see: Stephen Walt, “Was Obama’s Nobel Prize Speech Really ‘Realist?’” 
Foreign Policy, 18 December 2009.  Accessed from www.foreignpolicy .com.  
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However, before digging into the speeches and writings of the presidents, this essay will 
recount the broader context in which their policies and rhetoric were developed.  The theories of 
international relations will be summarized in order to provide an adequate understanding of the 
philosophical foundation upon which the presidents’ foreign policies were developed.  For 
example, Nixon did not travel to China simply because he thought it would be a cool thing to do; 
there were actually extensive philosophic reasons for doing so, which accomplished complex, 
strategic objectives.  This trend holds true for rhetoric as well.  For a brief example, Nixon did 
not talk about building a bridge of peace to China simply because it sounded nice; there were 
specific reasons for his word choices.  But first, the connections between the two fields of global 
studies and international relations will be explored.  Although quite similar at times, there are 
also some major differences between these two fields of academia.   
 
 
GLOBAL STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The discipline of global studies is a very broad one, perhaps one could say it’s as broad, 
expansive and diverse as the globe itself, providing a roof over many different disciplines, mixing 
them and bringing them together, including, but certainly not limited to: history, political science, 
economics, cultural studies, anthropology, geography, biology, theology, archaeology, philosophy 
etc.  Given the uniqueness of each of these traditional fields, they all connect differently with the 
global studies discourse.  This essay will specifically deal with a topic of contemporary history 
and international relations (including its philosophical foundation) within the context of global 
studies.    
 The relationship between the two fields of international relations and global studies may 
seem obvious, and it is at first glance.  However, there are also some poignant nuances worth 
mentioning which shed light on their differences and similarities.  Not all topics of study within 
the field of global studies would qualify as subjects of international relations, while not all topics 
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of international relations would qualify as subjects of global studies.  As mentioned above, global 
studies places great emphasis on being interdisciplinary, whereas international relations is most 
frequently considered one of the major disciplines within the broader field of political science.  
Ironically, the very core concept of international relations—the study of the relationship between 
“nations”—is antithetical to global studies’ mission to look beyond the nation-state’s bias and 
view the world through a paradigm of transnational interconnectedness.  The global studies 
discourse often seeks to ignore the nation-state or to look beyond it and to replace it with less 
nationally themed phenomena.  This mission is essentially subverted by the focus of international 
relations, which by definition looks at the nation-states individually and how they interact with 
one another.  The discourse surrounding the role and legitimacy of the nation-state is a robust 
one, from which many theses could originate, but this essay will instead focus upon the clear 
instances where the two fields overlap one another by recognizing that individual states develop 
their foreign policies within the context of the global community. 
 There are many international relations topics which lay outside the realm of global 
studies, in particular, border disputes between neighboring states.  Naturally states have some of 
their most intense relationships with the states they directly border or to which they are closest, 
and since the field of international relations studies the relationships between states, such 
neighborly relations, whether violent or peaceful, form a large portion of the discipline; however, 
these highly localized affairs often are not global in nature.  But, the discipline is also much 
broader, especially in eras of heightened globalization, which allows the most powerful states to 
project their power onto states that may be located very far away.  When states, or at least people 
from states, form relationships of any sort—peaceful, belligerent, economic, militaristic, religious, 
imperial, colonial, cultural, etc—with states in distance regions of the world, they become 
interesting topics of global studies as well. 
 In the field of global studies, one seeks to understand how the world works by analyzing 
topics that bring various regions of the world together in some capacity, often economic and 
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cultural, but also militaristic, etc.  Global studies is an attempt to view the big picture and 
sometimes, but not always, the big picture is dominated by big, powerful states, or at least the 
actions of the big, powerful states.  However global studies also extends beyond the study of big 
states and states in general, and thus it also extends beyond international relations and takes on 
many different angles, especially a historical one, from the time period before the rise of the 
nation-state, which was, after all, a rather recent development in human history. 
 The relationship between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of 
China is a good topic for both international relations and global studies.  Within the field of 
international relations, one would study the direct connections between the two states, but when 
placed within the broader context of global studies, other states and regions throughout the 
world begin to play a role as well, especially Russia, Taiwan, Pakistan and India, all of which must 
be considered in any analysis of the foreign policies of contemporary U.S. presidents. 
 
Global History 
One of the greatest contributions of global studies comes from the field of global history, which 
in some cases substantially challenges the dominant discourse of the various national histories.  
Some of the problems of non-global histories—the histories written before the development of 
global history—were their limited range and focus.  The limitations of the previous histories 
were primarily a result of their nationalist character.  History was written, or at least funded, by 
nationalists and intended for nationalist consumption.2  It goes without saying that nationalism 
ultimately, in its extreme forms, drove much of humanity, but especially Europe, into an era of 
extreme chaos and violence with horrific results.  From this devastating experience with 
nationalism, historians began looking beyond nationalism and nation-states towards the bigger 
picture—the global picture. 
                                                 
2 Univ. Prof. Dr. Peer Vries, “KU: Theories, Sources and Methods of Global History,” Universität Wien 
Wintersemester 2008. 
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However, the traditional forms of nationality have not been the only such biases to 
distort perceptions of history.  Even before the rise of nationalism, various sets of beliefs had 
similar effects of limiting the views and interpretations of historical events and phenomena, such 
as beliefs founded upon various scientific or spiritual followings. These can be seen in later—but 
still non-global—versions of the history of the Americas, in which a Darwinian European society 
explained the demographic transformation of the Americas using genetic ideas of superiority and 
inferiority.3  This was a history written by a white-European society, which provided an 
explanation and justification for the demographic transformation of the Americas.  The 
demographic transformations of the New World and the various racially-charged, genetic 
theories only re-enforced one another.  Perhaps “nationalism” is not exactly the correct term 
because here the issue is race not nationality, but in any event, the general principles still apply: 
this interpretation of events was a history written by a specific group of people, for consumption 
by their own group, and often functioned as a quasi-propagandist form of self-promotion.  
Notably, religion also played a similar role in distorting some of the interpretations of historical 
phenomena, including the demographic transformation of the Americas.  
 Global history seeks to break the narrowness and limitations of history by providing a 
historiography that is less nationally, racially, spiritually or regionally biased.  Global history, like 
globalization, is about the exchanges, communications and transformations of the societies of 
the globe, while trying to avoid the prejudices inherent in the previous histories, which were 
often written from regional, spiritual and more specifically national points of view. 
 Global historians use various methods to elevate their work from a nationally or 
regionally focused level to a truly global one.  Thus, for example, the global history of the United 
States of America is a seemingly paradoxical concept.  However, many of the most crucial events 
of U.S. history, such as independence, expansion, slavery, assimilation, etc. have truly global 
explanations behind them, either in their genesis or direct effects, and to give the big, global 
                                                 
3 Alfred W. Crosby, Germs, Seeds, and Animals: Studies in Ecological History (Armonk, New York 1994), 63. 
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explanation of these events would no longer be just a nationalist history of the United States, but 
rather a historical narrative comprising much of the globe—in other words, a “global history.”  
Likewise, the same is true of almost all modern states. Few and far between are the countries that 
have not been heavily touched by global processes, and thus the history of most states can be 
told in a limited, localized, nationally-biased and incomplete manner, or it can be told in global 
manner, which takes into consideration the global phenomenon that had direct local implications 
and places the local entity in a broader, more comprehensive context.4   
Perhaps somewhere there is an exception to this, but surely the overwhelming majority 
of North and South America cannot be fully separated from the broad story of global history, 
nor can their colonizers, nor their former fellow colonies in Africa, the Middle East and South 
Asia.  However, global history is not just a European colonial affair, as the Russians, the 
Ottomans and the Chinese became entangled in the system of colonization in differing ways, 
while also building their own empires, thus bringing their border lands into the web of global 
history—which certainly pre-dated the rise of the European empires.5  Additionally, almost all 
regions of the world have histories dating from before the European imperialists set sail, with the 
Silk Road and the great migrations being just two of the many quintessential portions of global 
history. 
This essay will specifically address a topic—the foreign policies of Richard Nixon and 
Jimmy Carter—which cannot be properly explained when limited to the field of U.S. history.  
Because their foreign policies were formed during the Cold War, a global understanding of that 
affair is necessary; the political and economic events unfolding in western and eastern Europe, 
the Caribbean, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and throughout Asia had a 
profound impact upon all Cold War policies.  Only global history can truly explain many of the 
                                                 
4 Prof. Dr. Andrea Komlosy, “VO: Austrian History from a Global Perspective,” Universität Wien Wintersemester 
2008. 
5 J. R. McNeill and William H. McNeill, The Human Web: A bird’s-eye view of world history (New York 2003) 44, 175. 
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Cold War decisions made in the United States, especially those of Richard Nixon and Jimmy 
Carter. 
 
Global History and the United States of America 
Although there seems to be a dispute regarding the exact meanings of the terms “global 
history“ and “world history,“ it seems, in general, that a differentiation is not necessary here, and 
if one in fact does exist, it is of little importance for this essay.6  The objective of both fields—if 
they are in fact separate fields at all—is to look beyond the dominating aspects of history, 
especially those determined in large part by a nationally oriented focus.  Although there is clear 
emphasis on the United States in this essay, U.S. foreign policy is placed within the context of 
global affairs.  It is not simply about the United States, but rather how the United States deals 
with the international community—how it deals with the process of globalization. 
 Histories are most often the narration and explanation of a particular nation, and as such 
are clearly identified as national histories.  Although they are not completely biased and skewed 
toward the glorification of the target nation, they do typically fail to explain many, if not all, 
relevant global phenomenon, even if, or perhaps especially if the historian is of the nation in 
focus.  This approach to history has been found to be insufficient in a world that is experiencing 
such a heightened process of globalization as the current one.  As mentioned above, the Cold 
War is a perfect example of a phenomenon that needs to be placed within a global context to be 
understood. 
 The fall-out from the First World War, including the Great (Global) Depression, and the 
rise of autarkic and fascists regimes in various regions of the world was an era in the history of 
humanity when barriers between peoples were put up, instead of being taken down.  However, 
these events and experiences, along with several other factors triggered the Second World War, 
                                                 
6 For an example of one historian’s interpretation of the distinction between the fields see: Bruce Mazlish, 
“Comparing Global History to World History,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 28 no. 3 (Winter 1998). 
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which ended the short lived era of de-globalization and began once again an era of globalization, 
or re-globalization.7 
 Each era of globalization has sought an explanation of the world and its problems, and 
typically these explanations are based upon the experiences and knowledge of the explainer.  
Knowledge of—and experience with—other societies are obtained largely through the process 
of globalization, which is by definition an increase in the contact and communication among the 
globe’s numerous and widely diverse societies.  This has occurred many times in the past and will 
likely continue in the future, although not in one continually linear progression, but rather via 
cycles of globalization interspersed with eras of de-globalization. 
 Although the processes of de-globalization and re-globalization can together be seen as a 
more or less constant phenomenon, the actors, the modes, the forms and the levels of 
globalization are certainly not consistent.  It is, in fact, these inconsistencies and variations of the 
flavor of globalization which have led to different interpretations of the events and experiences 
of human history. The current era of globalization is no exception.  It is like the other eras of 
globalization in that it is unique and distinct from them aside from the fact that people across the 
globe are experiencing greater levels of contact with one another—the defining aspect of 
globalization.  The actors, the philosophies, the modes, the forms and the levels of globalization 
are all different. 
 The contemporary era of globalization is defined in part by the United States of America 
functioning as the chief promoter of this round, along with its principles of democracy and 
capitalism which originated from and continue to dominate the societies of Western Europe.  
Undoubtedly, the modern, western, liberal democracies of Europe and a few other locations also 
play a strong role in promoting contemporary globalization.  This is in sharp contrast to the 
former imperial and colonial elitists of Western Europe, who were the chief engineers of the 
previous round of globalization.  Although many modern critics of globalization equate modern 
                                                 
7 Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Globalization, Convergence, and History,” The Journal of Economic History 56 no. 2 (June 
1996) 277. 
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global capitalism with the former mercantilist imperialism through terms such as “neo-
colonialism” and “neo-imperialism,” surely great differences can be observed between the social 
interactions and the political institutions involved. 
 
The United States, Global Power and the Cold War 
As mentioned above, any state and its history can be incorporated into a discourse of global 
history.  However, for some states, there is a lot of stretching that needs to be done, and some 
only reach a truly global level and become part of the global story through incorporation with a 
larger, more prominent global player—typically a former colonial master or through patterns of 
mass migration.  But some states just naturally have their own prominent global connections and 
thus are natural features in the global story.  This is true for basically any state that has developed 
a navy with a broad, even global, reach—such as the western European colonial powers—as well 
as states or societies that developed the ability to similarly travel vast expanses of space by land 
such as the Ottomans, the Arabs, the Mongols and the Russians, each of whom conquered 
significantly large and diverse territories through which their culture spread. 
 Currently, in the 21st century, there is a state that clearly falls into the category of being a 
global power: the United States of America.  This is not to say that the U.S. is a true global 
hegemon, since it does not firmly control the world and its authority can be seriously challenged 
in most regions of the globe.8  Also, the U.S. is not the only global power, but simply the most 
prominent; there are several others states that would also fall into this category, such as China, 
Russia and a united Europe, as well as some of Europe’s independent states.  Although this essay 
will take a predominantly historical route of a contemporary nature, it is worth keeping in mind 
the current global political situation since it gives a poignant relevancy to the past. 
 The exact point at which the United States became a true global power can be debated, 
but certainly after the Second World War the U.S. was actively playing the role of a global power 
                                                 
8 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York 2001) 41. 
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and although it had previously established relationships with many regions of the world, they 
became much stronger after the war, during which time the Cold War was not fought, when such 
relations were of crucial strategic importance.   
 The Cold War is one of the hottest topics of international relations since it was a classic 
system of bipolar powers competing for global supremacy.  It was the era during which many 
theories of international relations could be observed in action in a real world setting.  Clearly, 
given that it was an interaction between two states, the Cold War perfectly falls into the field of 
international relations.  However, given the global reach of the antagonists, it also falls quite 
neatly into the field of global studies, and while the Cold War itself has been concluded, the 
endurance and longevity of the United States of America and its global power have made it a bit 
difficult to see in terms of global history—which tends to need a rather great deal of distance for 
the big picture to emerge—despite its now obviously historical nature.  Certainly, the Cold War 
is not unique in its ability to unite international relations and global studies, but it is a noteworthy 
example, and even one that has strong connections to the current international system, lending it 
even greater relevancy for today. 
 Because the Second World War and the Cold War together fundamentally transformed 
the United States’ relationship with the global community, it is natural that new questions would 
be asked while the general understanding of global affairs would come under great scrutiny.  The 
process of finding a new understanding of the U.S. role in the world was not new; it had been 
going on since independence.  The earliest U.S. approaches to global affairs had been the 
Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine which called for the western expansion across the 
continent to the Pacific coast and a lack of tolerance for European imperialism in the western 
hemisphere, respectively.  By the dawn of the twentieth century, the Manifest Destiny had not 
only been fulfilled but also extended beyond the coast through the annexation of the Kingdom 
of Hawaii; the annexations of the Spanish colonies of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico; 
and the establishment of suzerainty over Cuba, which effectively destroyed Spain’s global empire 
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and established the United States as a European-style overseas colonial empire.  However, that 
era was short lived because the First World War had begun the decline of global imperialism and 
sparked the genesis of President Wilson’s idealism, which called for self-determination and 
democratization, a direct contradiction to colonialism which in turn ultimately undermined 
imperial authorities across the globe, including those of the U.S. itself. 
 Idealism and its hallmark institution, the League of Nations, failed to prevent the rise of 
fascism and the Second World War, which counted idealism among its many victims and 
essentially terminated the era of European imperialism for good, leading the United States to 
find a new understanding for its role in global affairs.  The newly interpreted philosophies of 
realism and liberalism emerged to dominate the discourse.  Although neither realism—inspired 
by Machiavelli’s realpolitik—nor liberalism—inspired by Kant’s Perpetual Peace—were profoundly 
new, their new interpretations allowed the United States to reassess its role in global affairs.  Not 
surprisingly, their proponents often find references and examples from throughout both U.S. 
and global history to support their theories and to turn their policy prescriptions into realities.  
Both realists and liberals can credibly claim great historical legacies.  The World Wars changed 
how the U.S. viewed itself within the greater global context, which, in any event, had undergone 
its own metamorphosis.  Consequently, the U.S. transformed itself from a predominantly passive 
follower of the British-led, free-market imperial system to a leader of the new international 
community and the global movement of democratic capitalism in its global conflict with 
internationalist communism. 
 
The next chapter of this essay will provide a general background of the theories of international 
relations that have significantly shaped the United States’ perception of its place within the global 
community.  A basic understanding of the theory-based paradigms of realism and liberalism goes 
a long way in understanding the specific policies pursued by various presidents.  The following 
chapters will properly dig into the issue by examining some foreign policies of recent U.S. 
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Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter.  Nixon, along with his top foreign policy adviser, 
Henry Kissinger, is often thought to be the best example of American realism while Jimmy 
Carter’s reputation for supporting human rights makes him one of the most prominent liberal 
presidents.  This will allow for an analysis of realism and liberalism within the administrations 
most influenced by them.  And since the Cold War transcends their reigns, its effects on the 
study are essentially nullified because both presidents were engaged in the ideological struggle of 
the USA and USSR.  Additionally, both presidents used realism in their foreign policies, but 
ironically conjured up liberal rhetoric.  Grasping this dynamic leads to a clearer understanding of 
the distinct roles each theory plays within U.S. society and how the U.S. sees its place within the 
global community. 
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Chapter II 
The Theories of International Relations and the United States of America 
 
The main purpose of this essay is to look at the connections between global affairs and the 
conflict of policies and ideology as manifested in the foreign policies of U.S. Presidents Richard 
Nixon and Jimmy Carter.  Naturally, the field of international relations forms the foundation of 
this endeavor, thus it is necessary to include here a chapter about international relations theories 
to show how they relate to U.S. foreign policies and presidential rhetoric.  Hopefully this 
background information will clarify the discrepancy between the realist policies and the liberal 
rhetoric of both Nixon and Carter.  This chapter has been divided into five sections, the first of 
which deals with the so-called levels of analysis, which are the different divisions into which 
international relations topics fall.  These levels of analysis will provide the framework and 
broader context for the general overview of the systemic level of analysis and its theoretical 
paradigms of both realism and liberalism while also bridging the gap between global studies and 
international relations.  Finally, the last section will conclude with a look at how U.S. foreign 
policy is influenced and created by the two aforementioned paradigms of international relations 
theories, and thus how they are applied to the globalizing world and specifically to the policies 
and rhetoric of Nixon and Carter.   
 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
In order to facilitate the analysis of international relations, the leading scholars and texts often 
divide the field into three levels of analysis: individual, domestic and systemic.9  Each of the 
levels of analysis is useful, and knowledge of them all is essential in developing an understanding 
of historical processes. It is also worth knowing where the boundaries are that separate them 
                                                 
9 Steven L. Spiegel and Fred L. Wehling, World Politics in a New Era, 2nd ed., (Philadelphia, PA 1999) 542. 
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because a dialogue that drifts across the boundaries can easily become jumbled and weak.  Thus 
the focus of a discourse of international relations is often confined to one of the levels of 
analysis but it is certainly possible to combine them.   
The main concern of this essay is the systemic level of analysis, and this will be obvious 
after quickly considering all three of them, but the individual level of analysis will certainly be 
incorporated into each of the cases studies about Nixon and Carter.  The following pages will 
briefly look at each of the levels of analysis.  Even though the case studies of the subsequent 
chapters will primarily involve the systemic level of analysis, with a bit of influence from the 
individual level, looking at the them all first will develop the context in which they exist.  
 
The Individual Level of Analysis 
Not surprisingly, the individual level of analysis is the study of individual people and their impact 
upon international affairs.  One of the most obvious and recent examples is Adolf Hitler, whose 
personal opinions regarding race not only formed the backbone of the Nazi Party, but also 
played a significant role in foreign policy, especially the policies concerning the conquest and 
transformation of the Lebensraum.  For a fundamentally different example, one could look to 
Benjamin Franklin and his trip to Paris to visit the King of France, Louis XVI—whose own 
personality had much to do with the French Revolution—to ask for French assistance in 
defeating the British during the U.S. War of Independence, or one could also look at the 
ideological affinity of U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and their coordinated efforts to confront the Soviet Union’s control over eastern 
Europe, including Poland, an effort that was spiritually and morally supported by Pope John 
Paul II, an ethnic Pole by birth. 
 In general, despite the above examples, the affinity between global studies and the 
individual level of analysis of international relations is not all that strong.  Given the sheer 
number of people involved in the process of globalization and its recent democratization, it is 
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relatively rare that individuals can have profound impacts on the process of globalization itself.  
Of course, further back in history, when rulers ruled with absolute authority and the masses were 
uneducated and less affected by globalization, it was easier for individual elites to have a global 
impact; the modern rise of democracy limits the tenure of most leaders while also diverting 
significant elements of power to large legislative bodies with continually rotating, short-term 
membership.  Furthermore, these legislative bodies are controlled by the masses, who feel the 
impact of globalization much more immediately than the people of eras gone by.   
However, there are of course individuals who did manage to shape the history of the 
world, but these exceptions are relatively few.  Some of the obvious members of this club of 
utmost global elites would include Julius Caesar, Attila the Hun, Genghis Khan, Christopher 
Columbus and of course several more—they need not all be listed here.  For more recent 
examples of individuals who drove global affairs one could look to Mahatma Gandhi, whose 
movement of freedom and peace without violence continues to inspire peaceful rebellions today.  
One could also look to Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong, who, after leading the revolutionary 
movement of the Chinese Civil War, basically single-handedly shifted China away from its rigid 
alliance with the Soviet Union towards a more globalist approach of foreign policy along with 
U.S. President Richard Nixon, who actively sought to sharpen the Sino-Soviet split and began a 
tectonic realignment of global power, a topic that will be further explored in the next chapter.   
But to focus solely upon individuals in global studies would clearly leave out significant 
portions of global affairs which feature collaborative developments and movements among the 
masses, frequently involving thousands and even millions of people.  For example, to base the 
great impact of the Roman Empire on global history solely upon Julius Caesar would be unwise 
given that Rome was great not only because of its leader, but also because of its military, its 
institutions and its citizenry.  Caesar’s impact was profound, but there were clearly many more 
factors at play as well.  Furthermore, what could Christopher Columbus have accomplished had 
his mission not coincided with that of Spain’s unification and imperial rise?  Of course, the 
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individual achievements of Columbus played a major role in the Columbian Exchange, but the 
most significant aspects of that historic development were the ones that fundamentally changed 
the lives of millions upon millions of people.   
Although the individual level of analysis does clearly manifest itself in this essay via the 
fact that the two following case studies are centered around and defined by individuals—Richard 
Nixon and Jimmy Carter—the other levels of analysis also play major roles.  In fact, the general 
conclusion will be that the individuals were not nearly as important as the circumstances 
surrounding them.  This is especially true of Carter, who initially favored a morally liberal 
approach to foreign policy, which ultimately was consumed by the demands of the global system, 
the central aspect of the systemic level of analysis. 
 
The Domestic Level of Analysis 
In the second level of analysis of international relations, domestic concerns play the centralizing 
role.  Of the three levels, this one is the most antithetical to the objectives of the global studies 
discourse, given its national-centric approach; however, the next few paragraphs will highlight a 
few bridges that bring the fields together.  With this level of analysis one seeks to explain a state’s 
approach to international affairs by examining its domestic characteristics.  Naturally, the form 
of government of any given state plays a central role within this level of analysis. 
Democratic governments are often divided into executive, legislative and judicial 
functions.  In the United States of America, each of the aforementioned functions solely 
comprises each of the three independent branches of the government.  On the other hand, a 
Westminster parliamentary system features a more blended distribution of power with the 
executive and legislative being largely combined.  The ways in which power and responsibility are 
distributed within a state can be incredibly important in a state’s international affairs.  For 
example, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson essentially developed the League of Nations, but was 
unable to see his country become a member due to the blockade of the U.S. Congress, which 
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was protesting a presidential power grab and a perceived loss of its own sovereignty to the 
executive.  Most Prime Ministers would most likely not face such a situation given their 
leadership role within the combined executive and legislative body.   
Chasms within a legislature often develop along party lines, and their corresponding 
conflicts naturally flow into foreign relations as well.  This was particularly evident in the United 
States during the recent Iraq War, but similar struggles between the parties often arise during the 
passage of international treaties and trade deals, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Similar power struggles can also be found within the executive branch itself; the clash of 
the U.S. Departments of State and Defense are a classic example.  Also, elections play such an 
extensive role in democratic states that even international relations can be affected.  The 
Hollywood movie Wag the Dog10 famously depicted a fictional president who took his country 
into a fake war so that the press—an essential component of any properly functioning 
democracy11—would have something other than his politically disastrous sexual affairs to talk 
about.  Although the movie was completely fiction, it does demonstrate how domestic political 
affairs can have a profound impact upon foreign policy.  It will never be known how U.S. 
foreign policy would have unfolded had Nixon’s Watergate scandal not reverberated through the 
U.S. political system.   
Even legitimate wars can be profoundly impacted by domestic circumstances, such the 
United States’ contemplation of entering the Second World War, an act that conveniently 
brought an end to the seemingly unending Great Depression.  George Orwell also discussed a 
similar phenomenon in his acclaimed novels 198412 and Animal Farm.13  There is no doubt that 
numerous leaders throughout history have used wars to bring their people together for a 
common cause, this was particularly true of the fascist empires, and undoubtedly, the global 
                                                 
10 Wag the Dog, prod. and dir. Barry Levinson, 97 min., New Line Cinema, 1997. 
11 W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, ed., Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the 
Gulf War (Chicago 1994) 7. 
12 George Orwell, 1984 (New York 1961). 
13 George Orwell, Animal Farm (New York 1996). 
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conquests of the British Empire were used as nationalist propaganda at home for political 
purposes.   
As just noted, non-democratic regimes also confront similarly domestic-centric concerns 
in their international relations.  One obvious example is the marriage of a monarch, which of 
course corresponds to the individual level of analysis as well.  England’s Queen Elizabeth I 
notoriously refused to marry, a decision that was at least as important to global affairs as it was 
to her personal life.  In her era, a royal marriage was also a political alliance or even union, thus 
royal marriages were acts of international affairs.  Likewise, on the Iberian Peninsula, the 
marriage of King Ferdinand III of Aragon to Queen Isabella I of Castile and León paved the 
way for the completion of the unification of Spain, the Reconquista and the Golden Age of the 
global Spanish Empire, including Columbus’s discovery of the New World.  The Spanish 
Inquisition was part of the broader regional phenomenon also incorporating elements of the 
Reconquista, and ultimately the movement was brought to the newly discovered Americas by the 
conquistadors.  The domestic affairs of Spain—especially the union and dogmatically Catholic 
objectives of Ferdinand and Isabella—translated themselves into global affairs and led directly to 
one of the greatest transformations in global history, the Columbian Exchange.  Furthermore, an 
understanding of Spain’s domestic policies is necessary in understanding some of the root causes 
of the so-called American Bifurcation.14   
However, despite the obvious cases in which domestic affairs have transcended their 
borders to become global affairs, the more a study focuses on domestic affairs, the less it focuses 
on global affairs and at some point, one would logically question the validity of including it 
within the discourse of global studies.  For this reason, the domestic level of analysis, although 
sometimes concerned with global affairs, is the one least relevant to the field of global studies.  
According to the common wisdom of Carter’s shift to a liberally focused foreign policy, the 
domestic level of analysis would be very relevant; however, the second case study of this essay 
                                                 
14 Peter Gärtner, “The Americas in Globalization – Causes and consequences of the American bifurcation,” 
MWG07, MWG08, Institute für Geschichte: Universität Wien. (Sommersemester 2009). 
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will refute the common wisdom, while demonstrating that the systemic level is more important 
for U.S. foreign policy. 
 The domestic level of analysis does manifest itself in the following case studies, but its 
role is more supportive than centralizing.  When comparing President Carter to Nixon, the 
domestic level of analysis explains why they supposedly had such different approaches to foreign 
policy.  As mentioned above, only the Watergate scandal can explain why and how the U.S. 
seemingly shifted so dramatically from Nixon’s traditional realism to Carter’s moral liberalism.  
The domestic scandal itself did certainly and directly impact the development of Carter’s foreign 
policy, but as the forth chapter will conclude, ultimately, at the end of the day, Carter’s decisions 
were more firmly rooted in the systemic level analysis, despite his rhetoric. 
 
The Systemic Level of Analysis 
Finally, the systemic level of analysis is the level of international relations most concordant with 
the global studies discourse.  Most significantly, both fields share the same orientation: they both 
use a global context as their foundation.  In analyzing the entire system of states, this level of 
analysis transcends national, state-centric concerns by focusing upon broader global conditions 
and features, as does global studies.  Essentially, the systemic level of analysis of international 
relations is the political branch of global studies.  It is within the systemic level of analysis that 
the classic debate between realism and liberalism exists, alongside a few others.   
The main point of consensus between realism and liberalism is that the global system is 
anarchic—there is no one in charge.15  There is no global king, dictator, prime minister or 
president.  There are no true global policemen or soldiers to keep the peace, despite the United 
Nations’ efforts.  There is no global court which can truly enforce global justice.  Most scholars 
agree that the only global law is the law of the jungle, where anything goes.  Because there is no 
global order, all states must defend themselves; those which fail to do so, also fail to survive.  
                                                 
15 Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy No. 145 (Nov.-Dec. 2004) 56. 
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This global condition of disorder is identified by the term anarchy.16  It is the principle from 
which the grand theories begin.  The realists accept anarchy as eternal and seek to survive within 
it.  The liberals believe that it can be tamed and brought under control. The various “radical” 
theorists believe that it can be overthrown altogether and replaced by some sort of New World 
Order, which fundamentally alters the condition of global anarchy.17 
   
THE SYSTEMIC THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Stephen Walt is one of the most influential theorists in the field of international relations today.  
In addition to his significant contributions to the academic discourse, including his deep and 
complex analyses, he has written a brief, but brilliant, article to explain the relevancy of 
international relations theory to today’s world and the impact that theories have on public policy 
in the contemporary United States.  His article in Foreign Policy provides a great background for 
this essay, and includes one paragraph in particular that explains why realism and liberalism are 
the best theories to use in seeking an understanding of the U.S. approach to global affairs: 
The study of international affairs is best understood as a protracted competition between 
the realist, liberal, and radical traditions.  Realism emphasizes the enduring propensity for 
conflict between states; liberalism identifies several ways to mitigate these conflictive 
tendencies, and the radical tradition describes how the entire system of state relations 
might be transformed.  The boundaries between these traditions are somewhat fuzzy and 
a number of important works do not fit neatly into any of them, but debates within and 
among them have largely defined the discipline.18 
The case studies of this essay do not include all three of Walt’s categories because the “radical 
tradition” is not a singular cohesive group, but rather a combination of various theoretical ideas, 
and as such it is impossible to consider them in general terms.  An attempt to do so would 
                                                 
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (England 1651). 
17 Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy No. 110(Spring 1998) 30. 
18 Walt, “International Relations,” 30. 
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necessarily require them to be looked at individually, but there are simply too many of them to fit 
into this essay.  Nor are they particularly helpful for this approach, but before summarily 
dismissing them, a few quick paragraphs can explain why they, or at least a couple of them, are 
being dismissed here. 
 
The various other theories of international relations 
Clearly the field of international relations contains a breadth and diversity that this essay will only 
begin to explore.  It would be impossible to adequately take into consideration all the theories of 
international relations in one essay, thus this essay will look only at the two most influential: 
realism and liberalism. 
 However, before taking a brief overview of the aforementioned theories of international 
relations, the reasons for not including the others should be addressed.  Much of the work 
conducted within the field of international relations is theoretical, including the paradigms of 
realism and liberalism; however, they have both been applied in the real world, making them 
more than just mere theories.  They are also associated with actual policies and as such can be 
observed in a real world setting.  Not all theories share such a connection to the real world.  
Some remain in the minds of scholars.  There is certainly nothing wrong with the unobservable 
theories, some are quite fascinating indeed, but the purpose of this essay is to observe and 
analyze policies conducted in the real world, during the administration of Presidents Richard 
Nixon and Jimmy Carter; therefore, theories of pontificating professors and scholars imagining 
an alternative world order simply will not do, at least not here in this essay.  (Maybe there will be 
seats at the table for them the next time around.) 
 An example of one such theory is the result of the application of feminist theory or 
gender studies to the field of international relations.  This global theory is based upon the same 
foundation of many facets of gender theory: the division of labor between the genders in the so-
called hunter-gatherer societies, where men used physical strength and force to obtain 
  
   
 
27 
 
resources—primarily food—and to protect their families.  Although their actions were 
sometimes coordinated into teamwork, there was greater emphasis placed upon individual 
leadership and individual skill.  Great warriors and great hunters became great leaders and great 
procreators.  According to many gender theorists, the above mentioned traits are to be 
considered “masculine,” and since the world has frequently experienced wars of a similar 
nature—the reliance upon unilateral strength, violence and brute force, as well as the violent 
pursuit of resources—they have attributed masculinity to the violent conflicts around the world.  
The contemporary and historic global systems have been masculine systems.19 
 On the other hand, gender theorists have conceptualized an alternative feminist world 
order which would reflect the roles of women gatherers who utilized collaborative, nonviolent 
efforts to gather food, including the remembrance of where and how to harvest or gather certain 
edible substances and also how to raise and educate the children.  Supposedly, a feminist world 
order would be based upon nonviolent collaboration in international affairs—in other words, a 
feminist world order would be peaceful and based upon diplomacy rather than violent and based 
upon warfare.  Ironically, in this crudely brief and simplistic overview of gender theory in 
international affairs, masculine and feminine global systems become the classic yin and yang of 
war and peace; confrontation and diplomacy; hard and soft power; hawks and doves; arrows and 
olive branches; and realism and liberalism.  However, neither realists nor liberal internationalists 
base their ideas upon gender roles.  The main distinctions between global feminism and 
liberalism arise in the nuances provided by the specific focus on gender.   
For example, gender can be considered in international developmental aid as feminists 
would advocate for allocating money to women who are more likely to invest it in the health and 
education of their children instead of allocating it to men who seem to be more likely to invest it 
in symbols of wealth such as showy jewels for their wives or indulgences for themselves such as 
such as fancy gizmos, drugs, alcohol or additional women, or also for acts of warfare to maintain 
                                                 
19 J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York 1992) 27. 
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their territory or to conquer more.  The feminists would argue that because women typically take 
care of the children, they will invest in them—their health and education—thus investing in their 
society’s future stability and providing a higher return of invest in comparison with the typically 
male concerns.20  
 Nonetheless, the international system, in the big, global picture, has essentially always 
been masculine, and the feminists’ projections are merely that, speculation.  They can be 
observed in small, isolated instances, but not on the global scale, or the systemic level.  
Regardless of how well founded those speculations may be, their lack of mass manifestation does 
little to explain how the United States of America deals with the process of globalization within 
the confines of the current world order.  Perhaps one day women and feminist concerns will rule 
the world, but until then, it is best to accept the masculine order and seek to understand how it 
functions the way it does.  There is little to no evidence to suggest that a gender theory can 
explain the policies and rhetoric of Presidents Nixon and Carter. 
 Likewise the Marxist and post-Marxist understandings of global affairs do little to explain 
the foreign policies of the United States and, more specifically its understanding of its place 
within the international system.  This judgment is based largely upon the U.S. perception of 
Marxism in general.  Although he remains a popular figure at universities from coast to coast, 
Karl Marx and his vision of the great anti-capitalist revolution have been largely discredited via 
the failures of the Soviet Union and its satellite states.  Marxists across the globe naturally 
disagree with such a dismissal, and thus subsequently Marx’s ideas concerning class and labor are 
still very influential, especially via their corresponding dependency theory.  However, Marxist 
theories still fall outside the parameters of this study, which addresses the United States’ 
perception and reaction to global phenomena.  If the public at large dismisses the Marxist 
approach, then its representatives in the democratic government will too.21  There is little to no 
                                                 
20 Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, “The Women’s Crusade,” New York Times, 23 August 2009. 
21 The connection between public opinion on policy matters and the democratic government will be touched upon 
later in the final chapter. 
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evidence to suggest that Marxist-based theories can explain the policies and certainly not the 
rhetoric of Presidents Nixon and Carter.  If Marxism is not accepted within the government, 
then there must be an alternative concept of global affairs on the table.  In fact, there are two 
alternatives which together comprise the discourse: realism and liberalism.  For this reason, the 
rest of this essay will focus exclusively upon them, as they hold the key to understanding the 
foreign policies of the United States and its general approach to global affairs. 
 
REALISM 
Although realism is concerned with theory, it is incorrect to say that it is “a theory.”22  Stephen 
Walt refers to it as a “theoretical tradition,”23 while John Mearsheimer calls the ideas of realism 
“bodies of theory.”24  These awkward and clumsy terms must be used because realism—nor 
liberalism—is a true, singular theory, but rather it is a collection of theories that complement and 
build upon one another.  However, a sharp line of division can be drawn between the groups of 
realist theories and liberal theories, thus they each comprise their own paradigms of international 
relations theory.25 
In this essay, the term “realism” is used in a broad context with no substantial preference 
for the various schools of realism which include classical realism, neo-realism, defensive realism, 
offensive realism, etc.  Realism is based upon the principles of realpolitik, and in fact, many 
writers use the terms interchangeably, although, “realism” is most often used in the discourse of 
international relations theory, while “realpolitik” is more highly associated with the political 
philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli,26 but the ideas are quite similar.  Quickly, it is worth noting 
the major difference between Machiavellian realpolitik and the realism of international relations 
theory: Machiavelli wrote about both domestic and foreign affairs within the context of medieval 
                                                 
22
 Walt, “International Relations,” 31. 
23 Walt, “International Relations,” 31. 
24 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 14. 
25 The term “paradigm” has been picked-up from: Spiegel and Wehling, World Politics in a New Era, 542. 
26 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince and Other Writings, Translated by Wayne A. Rebhorn (New York 2003). 
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politics in southern Europe, while the realism of international relations theory obviously looks 
exclusively at foreign affairs, especially within a more contemporary context—regardless, the 
basic principles are nearly the same, which is why Machiavelli is often considered to be the 
grandfather of modern realism. 
 Although none of the early realists had contact with each other, their observations had 
some major similarities concerning the interaction of various political units within their regional 
systems.   The realist paradigm could not be more global in its roots: it began emerging about 
2500 years ago in the writings of Sun Tzu (The Art of War) in ancient China, Thucydides 
(Peloponnesian War) in ancient Greece and Kautilya in India.  Many centuries later, during 
Europe’s Renaissance, realism experienced a philosophical revival in the writings of Machiavelli 
(The Prince) and Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan).  One could certainly debate the point or points at 
which realism leapt from history and philosophy to grand public policy, but clearly the transition 
had occurred by the time of the Congress of Vienna in 1815.  Under the leadership of the 
Austrian Minister Prince Klemens von Metternich the ideas of realism were implemented on a 
pan-European scale and ultimately traveled to the halls of power in Berlin, where they were 
notoriously put to use by Prussian Prime Minister and German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 
the late nineteenth century.  (As an interesting side-note, the connection between German 
statesmen and the principles of realism apparently migrated to the United States, as is evidenced 
by U.S. National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger,27 who was 
President Nixon’s most influential foreign policy advisor.  However, Kissinger was certainly not 
the only U.S. statesman to utilize the principles of realism, since they have—as was stated in the 
previous chapter—been used throughout U.S. history.) 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the failure of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s 
idealism led to a dramatic revolution in U.S. academia and its understanding of the world.  
Democracy and self-determination had formed the foundation of idealism and the League of 
                                                 
27 Kissinger was born to a Jewish family in Bavaria during the interwar era.  His family fled Nazi persecution by 
emigrating to the United States. 
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Nations had failed in its objective to defend them and prevent another World War.  The United 
States’ and Wilson’s entire concept of global affairs was washed away, paving the path towards 
the realist revival. 
 The contemporary realist writer John Mearsheimer has identified the most significant 
realist scholars: E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz.28  All three authors published 
their seminal works around either the Second World War or the Cold War and provided theories 
to explain the dynamics of global politics.  Naturally they were each highly influenced by the 
great conflicts of their time.  Their works may all be part of the broad realist discourse, but they 
certainly did not agree on everything and some distinctions do exist among their ideas; however, 
the main ideas are in harmony with one another. 
 As stated above, the basis of realism is the acceptance of global anarchy and the belief 
that because of this anarchy, states must defend themselves; they cannot rely on the good will of 
others.  State survival and self-preservation is the ultimate objective of any realist statesman.  A 
state’s ability to protect and defend itself and its interests is known as power.  Scholars often 
define power differently, but economic strength and stability are generally the most significant 
elements.  Of course population size and military might are important but even more important 
than the number of citizens is their skill level and available equipment which is generally 
determined by the state’s economic condition.  One million unskilled and unarmed peasants or 
foot soldiers cannot outperform one thousand soldiers with highly developed technology and 
weaponry.  Likewise, military might alone does not determine power because a solid, stable 
economy is necessary to support and maintain it.  Furthermore, militarily weak states with strong 
economies can readily arm themselves when the time comes.  No matter how it is defined or 
measured, state power is the key consideration of any realist because a state’s own power is its 
only means of protection in an anarchical system.29 
                                                 
28 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 14. 
29 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 12. 
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 With a global perspective, the realist paradigm usually focuses on the great powers and 
this point will be demonstrated in the following chapters which analyze the United States’ 
relationships with countries such as the Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan.  They may not 
be exclusively the world’s most powerful countries, but it is no coincidence that powerful states 
are relevant while small, powerless states are not. 
 The relationships amongst the greatest powers form an important part of the realist 
paradigm’s discourse.  The most simplistic division of power is the unipolar system in which the 
globe is dominated by one state, whether that domination is in the form of a true, absolute 
hegemon, or simply a state that is significantly more powerful than the others (but not 
omnipotent).  A bipolar system is characterized by two major powers.  The realist paradigm’s 
ability to explain the various aspects of the Cold War undoubtedly led to its popularity during 
that era.  Finally, a multipolar system has several significantly powerful states, among which there 
are no dominating leaders.  The various versions of realism disagree over which type of system is 
the most stable or peaceful.  A similar debate exists concerning transitions from one type of 
system to the next. 
 Although the trend can be observed to a lesser extent in unipolar and bipolar global 
orders, the multipolar system is typically characterized by alliances, which are essential elements 
of the balance of power theory.  This phenomenon came to life quite vividly as the European 
multipolar system began its transition into what would ultimately be the Cold War’s bipolar 
system.  One hundred years ago, the United Kingdom, France and Russia had organized 
themselves in the Triple Entente, in an effort to defend the global distribution of power from 
the rise of the German Empire and its fellow members of the Triple Alliance: the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire.  After the unsustainable truce of the inter-war 
period collapsed, the alliances basically reemerged.  Austria had been annexed by the Third Reich, 
during its rise to power and the Soviet Union had replaced Russia, but essentially the alliances 
had simply put themselves back together, despite the idealist endeavors to specifically prevent 
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that exact development.  As the dust of the Second World War began settling upon the 
destruction of Europe, the United States and Soviet Union began organizing the new bipolar 
world order, so often referred to as the Cold War.  Realists explain its coldness with their 
theories concerning the balance of power and the mutually assured destruction (MAD) of the 
nuclear age. 
 The bipolar balance of power and its accompanying alliances are much less dramatic than 
those of a multipolar system, as was experienced during the Cold War and its lack of direct 
warfare between the global powers.  However, warfare still existed, but among lesser powers, not 
the great ones directly.  The Korean and Vietnam Wars provide clear examples of that, along 
with numerous others.  Both Presidents Nixon and Carter governed during the Cold War and its 
bipolar system of global power had a profound impact upon both of their foreign policies, thus 
they are a good pair to compare, since the global dynamics of their terms as president were quite 
similar, especially in comparison to the global challenges to the U.S. before and after the Cold 
War. 
Finally the issue of national interest must be addressed more specifically than its brief 
mentions above.  The term “national interest” is itself a bit of a misnomer: the semantics of 
“state interest” would be more intuitive given that the concept is specifically about a state’s self-
interest, not the nation’s interest, but nonetheless, the widely used term is “national interest,” 
thus it is also the term used here in this essay.  According to realism, a state’s main objective is 
survival.  When the desire of a state to survive is combined with a state’s rationality, the result is 
a state acting to ensure its safety and security within the anarchical world system.  This is the 
phenomenon which is somewhat confusingly called “national interest.”   
Although the general concept is quite simple—a state will pursue the policies which are 
the best for it—it is actually very complicated because defining the state’s ultimate interest in a 
complicated world is not always easy.  During the Cold War, it was rather easy for the United 
States to define its national interests: halting the expansion of the global communist movement 
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and seeking to undermine the authority of the Soviet Union and its allies.  However, defining the 
national interest under other circumstances can be much more difficult.  Initial U.S. support for 
the Shah of Iran, Saddam Hussein and the Mujahedeen of Afghanistan has certainly come back 
to haunt it.  In these cases, U.S. support was granted for very different reasons, and in each of 
them a different turn of events caused harm to the U.S. national interest.  Perhaps, with all things 
being considered, the initial support may have been correct at the time it was issued, but 
nonetheless, each case demonstrates how the national interest is not always clear, especially in 
the long term. 
This phenomenon is true not only of the past, but also the present.  In Afghanistan, the 
United States is currently maintaining a corrupt regime at great cost to its society and budget.  Is 
the price being paid worthwhile to maintain the corrupt regime that governs where the Taliban 
once allowed Al Qaeda to plot its attacks on the U.S.?  The answer is far from clear, and thus 
subject to great debate.  A somewhat similar conundrum exists in Saudi Arabia where the United 
States has established lucrative trade deals with a human rights abusing regime, which financially 
supports radical Islam.  Both oil and Islamic fundamentalism flow freely from Saudi Arabia, but 
is it possible to stop one without it stopping the other?  In Egypt another such dilemma has been 
answered by the local population, not U.S. foreign policy makers; a dictator with a reputation for 
human rights abuses was overthrown by a revolution-inspired military coup.  What happens 
concerning Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel remains to be seen and it is not clear which policies 
would best maintain the peace.  How the success of the Egyptian revolution will affect the other 
states of the world—including the U.S.—also remains to be seen.   
This uncertainty is what can make the definition of a state’s national interest so difficult.  
The definition of the national interest played an important role in the foreign policies of both 
Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter.  Nixon essentially redefined the U.S. national interest 
regarding China by beginning the process of reconciliation, many years after the falling-out.  This 
shift in the perception of the U.S. national interest was used by Carter during his presidential 
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campaign as a tool to attack his opponent.  As the second case study of this essay will explain, 
Carter campaigned against Nixon’s revision of the U.S. national interest, but actually chose to 
continue the policy as president by developing and even closer relationship with the world’s 
more populous communist state.  Despite its lack of clarity and shifting nature, once the national 
interest has been established, the state will relentlessly pursue it, according to the realists.  This is 
a direct contradiction of liberal internationalism which pursues first and foremost liberal ideology; 
although, it should also be noted that liberals believe the promotion of liberalism to be analogous 
to the national interest, meaning that, one of the greatest distinctions between realism and 
liberalism is their concept of national interest. 
 
LIBERALISM 
Like realism, the concept of liberalism lies within the systemic level of analysis of international 
relations; however, given its nature, it does also reach into the domestic level of analysis at times. 
Also like realism, liberalism is not really a true theory, but rather it is a compilation of 
complementary theories based upon the general ideas of classical liberal philosophy.  Liberalism, 
like realism, is most accurately described as a paradigm of international relations theory.30  The 
various channels of liberalism are often pursued together at once, as is generally true in the 
United States, Europe and various other places across the world.  However, liberalism is like a 
buffet in the sense that policy makers may choose some policy prescriptions, while avoiding 
others.  A phenomenal example of this would be the People’s Republic of China which staunchly 
rejects democracy, while seeking to join international institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization and to pursue international trade, especially with the industrialized world and states 
rich in natural resources.  
 Given its pluricentric nature, liberalism can easily pull one in many different directions at 
the same time.  Because the central concept of this essay in not explicitly philosophical or 
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theoretical, liberal internationalism is best addressed in a more general sense.  Instead of 
becoming bogged down by the narrow specificity of the contemporary theorists, this essay will 
focus mainly upon basic concepts of liberal internationalism such as peace, human rights, 
democracy and free trade, and their influence on the rhetoric and policies of Presidents Nixon 
and Carter.  However, the next few pages will also include a brief overview of some of the neo-
liberal theories, in addition to the classical liberal theories. 
 
A Tale of Two Liberalisms 
Both realism and liberalism have another basic similarity, which is that both have two basic 
definitions: one that is generic and one that is specific to the field of international relations 
theory.  In the United States, foreign policy discussions can become quite confusing because the 
generic political definition of “liberalism” is not the same as the international relations theory 
definition of “liberalism.”  Politicians at the left end of the political spectrum and most members 
of the Democratic Party identify themselves as being “liberal.”  Additionally, the further to the 
left one’s ideas are, the “more liberal” they are generally thought to be.  This concept of 
liberalism is not the same as the liberalism of international relations theory, which is analogous to 
the ideas of the Kantian system, as outlined below.  Connections between the two can be made, 
especially at the philosophical level, but a significant difference between the two concepts often 
emerges in regards to public policy. 
A great example of how the two liberalisms can disagree is embodied by the U.S. labor 
union movement.  Generally speaking, the labor unions financially support politicians at the local, 
state and federal level who are members of the Democratic Party, which in turn supports 
legislation favorable to the unions.  However, the unions generally do not favor international 
trade and the general process of globalization due to the ensuing outsourcing of U.S.-based jobs, 
especially in the manufacturing sector, which has a difficult time competing against other 
countries where the cost of production is significantly lower due to lower labor costs and looser 
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environmental standards.31  Because global trade is one of the cornerstones of the liberal 
paradigm of international relations theory, it can be said that the U.S. labor unions support the 
Democratic Party’s domestic American liberalism, but oppose international liberalism, specifically its 
global free trade agenda. 
Conversely, the Republican Party’s members of the 103rd Congress (1993-94) were 
ultimately the ones who supported the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The 
bill was controversial with both bipartisan support and opposition; however, since the majority 
of the Republicans in both houses of Congress supported it while the majority of Democrats in 
both houses opposed it, the bill was essentially passed by the Republican party, which is generally 
regarded to be the conservative party—on the right of the political spectrum, opposite the 
“liberal left.”  Because of its mission to enhance international trade, the NAFTA bill is an 
example of legislation inspired by the liberal paradigm of international relations theory.  
Ironically, this liberal piece of legislation was opposed by the liberal politicians (of the left), but 
supported by the liberal party’s opposition.  Furthermore, in the United States, the liberal’s 
opposition party—the Republican Party—is the one that most strictly adheres to the theories of 
classical liberal economics (including free trade), which directly oppose many of the Keynesian 
and social welfare schools of economic thought, as advocated by the “liberal” Democratic Party.  
Thus it is correct to say that, generally, the Republican Party opposes domestic social liberalism 
while supporting classical liberalism, including Immanuel Kant’s international liberalism. 
To further the awkward confusion of liberalism, the fourth chapter of this essay will 
present a case study of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who was a member of the Democratic Party 
and is generally referred to as a “liberal.”  As the head of state and government, Carter 
orchestrated his foreign policy upon the principles of human rights, peace and the power of 
international treaties, all of which are essential elements of the liberal paradigm of international 
relations theory.  Thus, one could say that Jimmy Carter was actually both a domestic liberal and an 
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international liberal, but the two do not always go together and are not dependent upon one 
another, as demonstrated by the previous examples. 
 
From Liberalism to Perpetual Peace 
Because the driving force of this essay is the notorious conflict between realism and liberalism, it 
is important to understand their fundamental difference: the realists believe that global anarchy is 
eternal, while liberals believe that it can be replaced with a “perpetual peace.”32  This means that 
the realists pursue strength and power, which enable survival despite the anarchy, while the 
liberals pursue the utopian concept of a perpetual peace using the three cornerstones of liberal 
internationalism discussed below. 
 As indicated by the title of Immanuel Kant’s notorious essay of liberal internationalism: 
Perpetual Peace is the ultimate goal of liberal ideology when applied to the world.  This idea can be 
seen as a response to the writings of Hobbes and Machiavelli, which claimed that warfare was a 
natural condition of humanity.  Although the liberals may not fundamentally disagree with such a 
notion, they do reject the belief that it must always be so.  In fact, the liberal theories of 
international relations claim to light the path out of the despair of perpetual anarchy, violence 
and warfare.33 
 The great debate of the great philosophers from centuries ago continues to this day.  The 
concepts expressed in Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech, the Atlantic Charter (1941) and nearly all 
the note-worthy United Nation’s resolutions are evidence of liberalism’s perseverance despite the 
insistence of realist theorists, such as Mearsheimer34 and Kenneth Waltz35 that a global peaceful 
utopia is unrealistic.  For this reason, it is quite easy to tell when a statement or idea is based 
upon realism or liberalism: if the statement or idea indicates that global peace can be obtained, 
then liberalism was the source of inspiration, not realism. As the following case studies will 
                                                 
32 Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” 56. 
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 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations, 22. 
34 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 15. 
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demonstrate, the notion of a perpetual peace plays a significant role in U.S. foreign policy and its 
corresponding rhetoric. 
 
Human Rights 
Although the modern liberal concern for human rights can be traced back to the philosophers of 
the Enlightenment, John Locke in particular, the basic concepts of rights go back much further, 
as they originated in the various ancient civilizations.  However, in the modern era of global 
history, the debate concerning human rights began anew when the Old World met the New 
World.  The most notorious example was that of the classic historic debate between Bartolomé 
de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, known as the Valladolid Debate, in which the political 
status of the indigenous Amerindians of the New World was discussed.  Later the issues of 
human rights were picked-up by the liberal democratic revolutionaries on both sides of the 
Atlantic and expressed in two legendary documents: the (United States) Declaration of Independence 
and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.  Of course, these two documents did not 
automatically grant universal human rights to everyone; they did however initiate the on-going 
global trend of human rights promotion. 
 The importance of human rights to liberalism cannot be understated as 
acknowledgement of fellow human beings as equal is the very foundation of liberalism.  From a 
basic understanding of human rights, liberalism evolved to encompass civil rights, or the equality 
of treatment under the rule of law, which is itself another fundamentally liberal concept.  Only 
with recognition of human rights can the rest of the liberal agenda follow: capitalism (liberal 
economics), democracy, free trade and participation in international organizations.  For this 
reason, when liberalism is introduced in an illiberal land, the establishment of human rights is 
often the starting point.36 
                                                 
36 John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill and John Buckler, From the Revolutionary Era to the Present, Vol. C of A History of 
Western Society (Boston 1998) 691. 
  
   
 
40 
 
 In terms of international politics, human rights are very important for liberals because 
the basic liberal elements, such as a democratic, representative government and a capitalist 
economy rely heavily upon individualism and individual freedom.  Because human rights form 
the backbone of personal liberty and freedom, they are of great concern within the liberal 
paradigm of international relations theory.  Human rights have also played a very crucial role in 
U.S. political history.  As a president of the so-called “Deep South,” Carter was connected to the 
issues of human rights and equality in a way few previous presidents were.  The second case 
study of this essay will further explain how and why Carter influenced the liberal concerns about 
human rights and equality into U.S. foreign policy. 
 
Kant and the Triangle of Peace  
There have been hundreds, if not thousands, of scholars who have written about the liberal 
paradigm of international relations theory, but given the broad nature of the discourse, many 
scholars tend to focus on only one aspect of the paradigm.  However, Bruce Russett and John 
Oneal provide a great overview of the paradigm in their book entitled: Triangulating Peace: 
Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations.  Russett and Oneal use the triangular 
Kantian system to explain how the principles of liberalism are relevant to today’s world and the 
pursuit for global peace.  Their presentation of liberalism in the modern era forms the 
framework for this essay’s analysis of the liberalism of international relations theory. 
Russett and Oneal specifically discuss the “three elements that are key to ‘liberal’ theories 
of international relations: … [1] the promotion of democracy … [2] the bolstering of national 
economies;”37 and [3] “the construction of a thick web of international institutions.”38  In 
addition to being the framework of international liberalism, these basic notions are also the 
                                                 
37 Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations (New York 
2001) 24. 
38 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations, 26. 
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cornerstones of the triangle of the so-called Kantian system.39  Clearly, Russett and Oneal’s 
triangle of Kantian peace is based upon the work of Immanuel Kant, a philosopher of the 
enlightenment who wrote about many diverse topics.  He covered the topic of international 
relations in his manuscript entitled Perpetual Peace (1795), in which he essentially founded 
international liberalism, including the foundations for what would become the democratic peace 
theory. 
Kant believed that there were three keys to establishing a perpetual peace: democracy, 
economic interdependence and international institutions.  Furthermore, these three elements are 
not random and independent from one another, but rather they complement one another in a 
way that foster and reinforce one another.  The presence of two will help assist the third’s 
development.40  Also, Kant postulated that these three elements would foster peace while also 
being encouraged by peace themselves.  This means that one would expect them to develop 
during times of peace, but once these liberal elements are present, they will also encourage 
further peace, which in turn encourages yet more liberalism.  This cycle is what Russett and 
Oneal call a “virtuous circle.”41  This concept of the Kantian system is a brief, simplistic 
overview of the liberal paradigm of international relations theory.  Russett and Oneal’s concept 
of virtuous circles and the Kantian system explain how democracy, peace and human rights can 
enhance global political and economic connections.42 
 
The Democratic Peace Theory 
Although Kant was one of the early writers on the topic of democracy, he was certainly not the 
first; the ancient Athenians had actually created a “democratic” political system centuries earlier.  
However, it is worth noting that if somehow an ancient Athenian democracy were to be 
reestablished today, it would immediately be condemned as something less than truly democratic 
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according to contemporary standards and certainly unacceptable given its restriction of rights to 
a select minority.43   
In fact, democracy is one of the most global systems there can be, having been planted in 
Ancient Greece, discussed across early modern Europe—from the England of John Locke44 to 
the Prussia of Kant—and implemented via revolution in the North American colonies of the 
British Empire.  Democracy then went back to Europe in the form of the French Revolution 
which sparked revolutions across the continent and on the other side of the Atlantic.  When the 
French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) reached the 
colony of Saint-Domingue, a highly tumultuous debate followed, regarding to whom exactly 
liberal rights applied.  Eventually the slaves revolted, claiming liberty for themselves.45, 46  This 
liberal revolution proved to be a turning point in the illiberal policies of slavery across the 
colonized world as the morality and stability of the institution itself were further reconsidered.47   
In Europe, the desire for democracy continued spreading, and ultimately caused the 
revolutions of 1848 in nearly all corners of the continent.  Eventually, the dawn of the twentieth 
century and the same revolutionary fervor brought democracy to the Russian Empire.  Of course 
not all of the democratic revolutions were successful, and some paved the way for illiberal 
regimes such as those of Napoleon Bonaparte and Vladimir Lenin.  Not even the liberal, 
democratic Weimar Republic could stop the rise of the illiberal Third Reich.  But ultimately, as 
the global empires of Europe collapsed, predominantly democratic regimes ultimately took their 
place, not only in Europe, but also Latin America, South Asia and Africa, as well as parts of the 
Middle East and East Asia, leading Francis Fukuyama to proclaim that history had in fact come 
to an end now that liberalism was the clear global hegemonic philosophy.48 
                                                 
43 Eric W. Robinson, Ancient Greek Democracy: Readings and Sources (Malden, Massachusetts, USA 2004) 248. 
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Some scholars insisted that democracy was an inherently more peaceful form of 
government,49 but once it became obvious that democracies can be as belligerent as non-
democracies, the democratic peace theory was reformed to the belief that although democracies 
engage readily in warfare, they don’t do so against fellow democracies.50, 51  Even this claim is 
challenged by critics who believe that there simply have not been enough democratic states for a 
sufficient duration of time to make such a pronouncement.52  However, the European 
experience with democracy and the concurrent peace and stability have been astonishing 
developments.  The proponents of liberal internationalism believe that there is a direct 
connection between the peace and stability of post-war Europe and its embrace of liberal 
democracy.53, 54   
 
Economic Interdependence 
Global economic connections fit into the triangular Kantian system as one of the corners called 
“Economic Interdependence.”  This concept has two elements: a classical one and a 
contemporary one.  The most famous classical proponents of international economic 
interdependence were Adam Smith and David Ricardo.   
In the Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith not only created the discipline of economics, 
including the concept of the division of labor, but he also made the claim that trade must exist 
and be free to enable maximum economic output and wealth creation.55  Smith’s concepts 
formed the economic wing of the much broader liberal philosophy.   
David Ricardo further developed the concept of international trade in On the Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation (1817).  Specifically, he is known for writing about the concept of 
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comparative advantage, which is the understanding that a nation can maximize its wealth by 
producing the goods it can most efficiently trade, and then trading them for goods it cannot 
efficiently produce.  Of course, in order for this to occur, trade must exist and the lower the 
trade barriers, the more profitable everyone becomes.56  Essentially, comparative advantage in 
international trade is the global application of Smith’s concept of the division of labor.  
Riccardo’s concept of international trade is the global application of classical liberal economics.  
Thus, the contemporary global movements to support free trade are truly liberal movements. 
The principles of liberal international trade have been demonstrated nowhere more 
notably than in the European Union, which was initially founded as three separate organizations: 
the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the 
European Atomic Energy Community.  Although the first and third communities dealt 
specifically with energy concerns, throughout human history and across the globe, energy has 
been one of the most important factors of an economy, as was dramatically demonstrated by the 
industrial revolution and as the price of petroleum continuously reminds consumers today.   
These institutions were created amongst the rubble of the Second World War to help 
foster a perpetual peace in Europe, a goal the European Union has certainly achieved.  Likewise, 
Japan entered into a peaceful post-war relationship with the global community as it also 
developed lucrative economic connections.  Long before the theory of international 
institutionalism went vogue, the newly formed United States of America ended its two-war era of 
hostility with the British Empire, which coincided with the development of a significant trade 
relationship—much fairer than the one that triggered the Boston Tea Party.  To put it simply, 
the liberal paradigm of international relations theory claims that states that trade together are 
disinclined to fight one another. 
The liberal drive for free and fair trade also generated the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and most treaties and agreements concerning international trade.  Most significantly, 
                                                 
56
 Parkin, Macroeconomics, 458. 
  
   
 
45 
 
the liberal belief that good trade relations can prevent war led to the belief that the world would 
be safer if both Russia and China were included in the traditionally western-dominated World 
Trade Organization.  The latter has joined and the former is currently in negotiations for 
accession. 
 
International Institutionalism 
In addition to being features of economic interdependence, the EU, NAFTA and the WTO are 
each also examples of liberal institutionalism and Kant’s third element of Perpetual Peace: 
international organizations.  Other prominent examples include the global intergovernmental 
organizations such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and Interpol, as well as regional organizations such as the 
European Union, Mercosur and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Although the Congress of Vienna (1815) and its Concert of Europe were examples of 
proto-liberal institutionalism, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson is generally given credit for 
globalizing the concept of liberal institutionalism, via his public policies expressed in his 
infamous Fourteen Points speech, especially his insistence on creating the League of Nations. 
The basic concept of liberal institutionalism is that when states have the structured 
means to cooperate, they are more likely to avert war.  The institutions can provide a framework 
for cooperation that establishes norms and values, sometimes with a means of enforcing them, 
such as the United Nations Security Council and its peacekeeping missions.  Another significant 
contribution that institutions make towards the perpetual peace is a reduction in uncertainty, 
which encourages a peaceful handling of international crises.57  Of course, as alluded to above, 
international organizations also provide an essential means of facilitating economic 
interdependence via international trade organizations.  
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The Global Relevancy of Liberalism 
One cannot dispute the fact that the global community continues to deepen its embrace of the 
principles of liberal internationalism, a trend which has been going on for centuries.  That’s not 
to say that it has been a smooth transition.  The World Wars and Cold War were essentially 
challenges to the rise and spread of global liberalism.  Terrorism in junction with jihadi 
movements have emerged as another serious challenge.  However, the liberal global community, 
in general, does not fondly remember the times it departed from liberalism, or even the times 
that pre-dated liberalism’s triumph.  In fact, the movements against liberalism—monarchism, 
imperialism, fascism, communism—only served to deepen and expand liberalism globally.  The 
success of liberalism and the failure of the alternatives continue to encourage yet greater efforts 
to liberalization.58  
One can, however, dispute the relevancy of the liberal trend in international politics, 
which is exactly what the realists do.  The realists reject the liberal notion that international trade, 
economic interdependence and democracy make the world safer and more peaceful.  According 
to the realists, wars will break out whenever a state is threatened.  They acknowledge that even 
long periods of peace can be maintained, but eventually, the apple cart will be upset as global 
anarchy takes its toll.  This is the fundamental difference between realism and liberalism; the 
liberals accept anarchy, but believe it can be tamed by a perpetual peace, while the realists do 
not.59 
 
REALISM AND LIBERALISM IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Often in the realm of academia, the two components of a binary—such as realism and liberalism 
in international relations—cannot reasonably complement one another.  Typically in a binary, 
one has either black or white, left or right, rich or poor, or war or peace.  However, both realists 
and liberals may look at a situation and come to the same conclusion that a certain policy should 
                                                 
58 G. John Ikenberry, “The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 75, Iss. 3 (May/June 1996) 85. 
59 Walt, “International Relations,” 30. 
  
   
 
47 
 
be pursued in a specific manner.  They would indeed look at the situation differently and follow 
different thought-processes, but it is quite reasonable that they would arrive at the same 
conclusion.  In fact, that is exactly what happened with U.S. foreign policy during the great 
rivalry with the British Empire in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, and the German-
led alliances of the World Wars.  In these cases the liberal United States—or New World 
colonies, as was the case for the Revolutionary War—was opposing the illiberal British60 and 
German Monarchies and the fascist Nazi and imperial Japanese Empires.  Each of these cases 
pitted the liberal ideals of American freedom and democracy against illiberal, undemocratic, 
suppressive powers.  However, the U.S. position in each of these cases can also be easily 
advocated by the realist perceptions of the global power structure, national security and the 
strategic alliances which support it.  One could easily fill an entire library with books debating, 
describing and explaining the historic precedence of both the liberal and realist paradigms of U.S. 
foreign policy, and there is no need to finely comb through all that information here in this essay, 
but the general trend must be acknowledged. 
 
The discrepancy of rhetoric and foreign policy 
In his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer, one of the most prominent 
realist scholars in the United States today, briefly describes in his introductory chapter the 
dynamic which is the focus of this essay: the discrepancy between the liberal rhetoric and the 
realist agenda in the United States.61  Because Mearsheimer wrote his book to explain his refined 
version of the realist paradigm—a version he calls “offensive realism”—he does not dwell upon 
the discrepancy of rhetoric, but rather he points it out in his overview of the established 
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paradigms of realism and liberalism and their manifestations in U.S. foreign policy.  This essay 
does dwell upon the discrepancy by looking at specific case studies that illustrate the point. 
 However, this relationship of the two theory-based paradigms is quite interesting and 
gives a great deal of insight into the world of foreign policy, and the purpose of this essay is to 
further explore it.  Understanding this relationship could in fact provide a gateway into the actual 
foreign policy decision-making process and additionally showcase how the relationship between 
foreign policy and the democratic republic functions.  Understanding the discrepancy of rhetoric 
and policy could help explain contradictory policies such as why the U.S. sometimes supports the 
overthrow of democratically elected regimes, such as that of Salvador Allende in Chile in the 
1970’s, while also conducting an overthrow to create or strengthen democracy, such as the recent 
forced regime change in Iraq and attempted regime change in Libya?  Why did the United States 
support Augusto Pinochet in Chile but not Saddam Hussein in Iraq, keeping in mind that both 
were dictators who grossly violated human rights and subverted democracy?  Why did the Unties 
States’ criticism of human rights abuses in Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq lead to 
military action, but not in Rwanda, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, China, Bahrain, Iran or the Ivory 
Coast?—places where similar, and in some cases worse, abuses of human rights have been 
recorded.   
Did the United States enter the Second World War to defeat and replace dictatorial, 
human rights abusing regimes such as those which ruled Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and 
Imperial Japan, or did the U.S. enter the Second World War to defeat an alliance of states aiming 
to drastically change the world—socially, politically, ethically, economically and 
demographically—by military force?  Of course, both of these objectives were achieved, but 
were both scenarios necessary for the United States to reach its policy to enter the Second World 
War?  Or could just one of those conditions also have precipitated such a response?  In other 
words, would the U.S. have waged war against the Triple Powers if they had not violated human 
rights, but nonetheless intended to reform the global system as we know it?  Would the U.S. 
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have waged war against the human rights violators if they had not threatened the global power 
structure?  Of course, one can easily be sidetracked and sucked into a vortex of “what-if” 
questions about history, but here answers to these what if questions provide great insight into 
how one of the most powerful global players of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first 
centuries makes its foreign policy.  This in turn then explains how this great power understands 
the international system and views its place within it, which not only provides insight into the 
philosophies behind the United States’ foreign policies of the past, but also of the present, with a 
possible indication of what’s to come in the future.  Thus, by focusing on the various 
explanations of the past, revelations about the present and possibly the future come into focus.  
But first the questions of the past must be addressed, and here are some more poignant 
questions to consider, regarding this topic: 
Why did the United States form an alliance with a totalitarian, dictatorial, human rights 
violating regime such as that of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin to end the regimes of Adolf Hitler, 
Benito Mussolini and the Japanese Imperialists, when Stalin was guilty of similar crimes against 
humanity and ruled over an equally undemocratic, totalitarian regime?  Were the Soviet Union 
and the United States tangled in the Cold War because their respective political ideologies were 
incompatible (liberal, democratic capitalism vs. communist Marxism) or because their strength, 
size and power threatened the security of the other?  Did the United States lead the defense of 
Kuwait after it was invaded and conquered by the regime of Saddam Hussein because he 
violated Kuwait’s internationally recognized sovereignty, or because, as an aggressor, his regime 
threatened the stability of the Arabian Peninsula as well as the broader Middle East and perhaps 
even the greater Islamic world?  Did the United States invade Iraq for the second time in recent 
memory in 2003 because of national security concerns, or because it wanted to create a free, 
democratic state?  Would a free and democratic Iraq really benefit the United States strategically? 
There is not necessarily a right or a wrong answer to these questions, and the answer one 
comes up with would most likely be a reflection of one’s preferred theoretical paradigm.  Realists 
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would most likely have a similar set of answers while liberals would most likely have a differing 
set of primarily similar answers.  The purpose of this essay is in no manner to provide solid 
answers to these questions, but rather to look into their complexities.  Because the theories and 
their paradigms provide a framework for explaining how the world functions and how states 
subsequently behave toward one another, they shape the analytic processes of people, including 
decision makers; those who view the world through the realist paradigm will most likely create 
realist-inspired policies, while those decision-makers who view the world through a liberal-
inspired paradigm will most likely make liberal-inspired policies. 
The questions posed above highlight what would appear to be a bit of hypocrisy on 
behalf of the U.S. regime and its foreign policy.  This is equally true throughout U.S. history; 
although that particular group of questions above was restricted to the post-war era, one can 
easily come up with a similar group of questions for the pre-war era centering around policies 
concerning the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Manifest Destiny, the Monroe 
Doctrine, the Spanish-American War, the Mexican-American War and even the Civil War, just to 
name a few of the most obvious.  Face-value contradictions abound in U.S. foreign policies and 
perhaps the foreign policies of many states, especially democratic ones.  The following case 
studies about presidents Nixon and Carter will lay the foundation for explaining why the 
discrepancy between policy and rhetoric in U.S. foreign policy exists. 
So, the next logical questions one stumbles upon are:  Why does such hypocrisy exist? 
and What does this all mean?  Why does it matter?  As stated above, understanding the foreign 
policies of states, particularly the most powerful ones helps explain how the world functions, 
especially how and why conflicts and ultimately wars break out.  If an understanding of global 
conflict and warfare can be created, then perhaps it can be avoided or at least minimized, 
allowing for greater prosperity and opportunities for humanity to flourish in peace.  In regards to 
the hypocrisy, many scholars such as John Mearsheimer argue that there is no hypocrisy from 
the policies themselves (at least within the context discussed here), but rather the hypocrisy is a 
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result of the liberal rhetoric being used in regards to realist policies.62  The policies themselves are 
not hypocritical, but rather their rhetoric is.  This debate between realism and liberalism is one of 
the cornerstones of discussions about international relations in the United States and around the 
world.  The following chapters will look at how the discrepancy of rhetoric and policy and 
conflict between liberalism and realism unfolded during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and 
Jimmy Carter. 
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Chapter III 
Case Study: Richard Nixon 
 
Richard Nixon, the thirty-seventh President of the United States of America, makes a great case 
study for understanding the discrepancy of reasoning and rhetoric in U.S. foreign policy—the 
roles of realist and liberal international relations theories—because he is well known for his 
realist approach to foreign policy, thus there is little doubt about the reasoning he and his 
administration used in creating their foreign policies.  In fact, Nixon’s top foreign policy advisor 
Henry Kissinger is often thought of as the foremost proponent of realism in modern U.S. 
academia.63  At first glance, one might hastily conclude that Nixon and his policies contradict the 
notion of U.S. foreign policy having an intrinsic dispute between realism and liberalism—policy 
and rhetoric—but actually, this is why his case is so compelling.  Someone with such a strong 
reputation for realism should easily make the case that U.S. presidents can fall nicely into one 
camp—in the case of Nixon, that would be the camp of realism.  As an adherent to the realist 
doctrines, one could reasonably expect Nixon to defy Mearsheimer’s notion64 that U.S. foreign 
policy is realist in application but liberal in rhetoric because one would expect such a clear realist 
to have also used realist rhetoric.  However, this chapter will show that such a straight forward 
expectation is not in line with reality.  Nixon did in fact use liberal rhetoric to explain his realist 
foreign policies to the public, despite the reasoning that went into making them.  
 President Nixon actually enforces the notion of the discrepancy of rhetoric and policy.  
Essentially everyone knew that Nixon was a realist, with regards to international relations.  It 
would be difficult for someone to fundamentally dispute the fact then or now, which makes his 
use of liberal rhetoric all the more intriguing.  Although Nixon certainly did put forth a dishonest 
image of himself in an attempt to hide the truth from the public during various public affairs, 
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such as the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal,65 this was not really the case with his 
foreign policy rhetoric.66  He was not trying to hide and cover up his realist beliefs.  Remember, 
the point of this essay is that U.S. presidents use liberal rhetoric which appeals to the public to 
describe and support their realist policies, which, although they are in keeping with the realist 
national interest, may not be popular with the public.  Nixon is no exception to this.  He made 
policies based upon the teachings of the realist paradigm and theories of international relations 
while often cloaking them in a façade of rhetoric inspired by the liberal paradigm and theories of 
international relations. 
 
Nixon: an Overview 
Richard Nixon became a member of the national political establishment after being elected to 
the United States House of Representatives by the twelfth congressional district of California in 
1946 upon returning from military service in the Pacific during the Second World War.  After 
four years in the House of Representatives, Nixon moved to the Senate, where he served two 
years of his term before joining the executive branch of the federal government as the U.S. Vice 
President from 1953-61 in the administration of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 34th 
President of the United States.  Upon the end of his vice presidency, Nixon ran for a promotion, 
but lost the presidential election of 1960 by a slim margin to Senator John F. Kennedy.  In 1968, 
after spending several years in political exile, traveling and writing, Nixon ran for president again.  
Much of the campaign focused on social and cultural issues, such as the hippie and anti-war 
movements and the corresponding Vietnam War, which was ever increasing its unpopularity 
amongst the people.  Given that the war had been greatly escalated by presidents of the 
Democratic Party—Kennedy and his successor Lyndon B. Johnson—it is not surprising that its 
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unpopularity contributed to Johnson’s withdrawal from the Democratic Party’s primary election 
of 196867 and ultimately returned the Republican Party to the White House in 1969.68 
 Perhaps the most infamous of all the presidents, Richard Nixon became the first to 
resign from the presidency on August 8, 1974.  For many Americans, Nixon is most highly 
associated with the Watergate scandal that cost him his job.69  Of course, many books have been 
written about Watergate and other aspects about Nixon’s life.  This essay will not dwell upon 
most of these subjects, but because the Watergate scandal has so consumed the remembrance of 
the Nixon presidency, it must be briefly mentioned, especially because it was relevant to U.S. 
foreign policies and Nixon’s role as a statesman which are central topics of this essay. 
 The Watergate scandal took its name from Washington, DC’s Watergate Hotel, where a 
group of men were arrested for their forced entry into the Democratic Party’s headquarters on 
June 17, 1972, during President Nixon’s campaign for reelection.  It took the authorities nearly a 
year to conduct the investigation, collect all the facts, and conclude that not only was Nixon 
connected to the burglars, but also that he was aware of the illicit cover-up plan, despite his 
denials.  Because of the lies and deceit, the public, which had just recently reelected him in a 
landslide election, turned against him as did the House of Representatives—under the leadership 
of the opposition party—which initiated impeachment procedures on May 9, 1974. 
 The connection between Watergate and foreign policy became quite clear in hindsight: in 
his post-presidency, Nixon and his supporters put forth an image of him as a statesman to 
counterbalance the incredibly negative color with which the Watergate scandal had tarnished him.  
Although some historians, such as Joan Hoff, believe his domestic policies to be superior, most 
scholars view foreign policy as the most noteworthy aspect of the Nixon presidency.70  The 
notion that Nixon’s foreign policies should trump the tarnish of Watergate has two sources: 
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Nixon himself and the foreign policy establishment, primarily of the United States, but also of 
the global community.71 
 Historian David Greenberg made the case in his 2003 book, Nixon’s Shadow, that many 
members of the foreign policy establishment did not approve of Richard Nixon for a mixture of 
various reasons, ranging from his persona, style of governing, views on domestic policies and 
even some foreign policies; therefore, the Watergate scandal and the subsequent collapse of the 
Nixon administration left a great feeling of frustration—relief that their source of disdain was 
gone, but also regret that an astute statesman had been lost from public service.  Many foreign 
policy officials in the United States believed that foreign policy was über alles, thus they did not 
want the foreign policy accomplishments to be overshadowed by some disgraceful and petty 
political scandal.  There was a real concern that a backlash against all things Nixon could quickly 
spread like a wild fire and threaten to undo some of his major accomplishments, especially his 
breakthrough with the People’s Republic of China.72 
 As Greenberg points out as his main thesis, Nixon did not simply allow others—such as 
the foreign policy establishment—to recreate his image as an “elder statesman,” but rather he 
was directly and personally involved with the recasting of himself as the elder statesman.73  In 
fact, it would have been unlikely that the elder statesman image of Nixon could have emerged 
without his participation.  By giving speeches and granting interviews, he allowed himself to 
participate in the remaking of his legacy.  When he appeared for the public, either in person or 
through writers or politicians, he was able to remind everyone about his skill and success as a 
statesman, which helped chip away the image of a deceitfully scandalous politician.  Despite his 
efforts, and the efforts of various scholars, historians, diplomats, journalists, pundits and analysts, 
                                                 
71 Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow, 271. 
72 Raymond Price, With Nixon (New York 1977) 312. 
73 Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow, 271. 
  
   
 
56 
 
the statesman image never fully replaced the scandalous one.74  Whether or not it will be able to 
do so at some point in the future remains to be seen. 
 
NIXON’S REALPOLITIK 
That Richard Nixon and his chief foreign policy architect, Henry Kissinger, practiced realism is 
widely accepted.  Kissinger, often regarded as the godfather of modern realism in the U.S.—at 
least one of its foremost policy makers—has written several tomes on the subject, which include 
the clear recognition of the fact that Nixon’s understanding of the world was based upon the 
realist paradigm of international relations and his policies which reflect that.75  Nixon’s 
ideological perspective of the world is no surprise given the trajectory of his career, which had 
much to do with foreign policy. 
Nixon’s on-the-job training as a realist statesman stem from his entire career.  As 
mentioned earlier, he had a front row view of U.S. foreign policy in action as a member of the 
Navy, through which he participated in the military defeat over imperial Japan.  As a young 
congressman and member of the Herter Committee he actively participated in the creation of 
one of United States’ greatest levels of international engagement—the Marshall Plan, which 
actively contributed to Europe’s division into two spheres: one western, capitalist and democratic; 
the other eastern and communist.76  The corresponding bipolar global order, while being 
completely consistent with the principles of liberalism, assisted in giving birth to the modern U.S. 
understanding of the realist paradigm of international relations theory.77   
In the House of Representatives and the Senate Nixon participated in the anti-
communist movement, exposing domestic spies working in the U.S. government and attempting 
to thwart the global encroachment of communism.78  Although as vice president he had very 
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little power, he naturally gained much experience, especially given that his tenure occurred during 
the early post-war period, when the United States was heavily engaged in international affairs; 
furthermore, he also served under President Eisenhower—a general from the Second World 
War—who certainly provided a great deal of mentoring.  On behalf of the president, he traveled 
to several countries to promote U.S. foreign policy, including Venezuela, Libya and even the all 
important Soviet Union, the state around which nearly all U.S. foreign policies revolved. 
 However, Nixon was forced into a long holiday of sorts when he lost the general election 
of 1960.  It was one of the closest presidential races in U.S. history, complete with a litany of 
controversies, but, at the end of it all, John F. Kennedy won while Richard Nixon lost.  He tried 
to redeem his political career by running for the governor of California in 1962, but again lost, 
leading many to conclude that he would never return to the political scene as he himself had 
indicated.79 
 Although Nixon was removed from the realm of public awareness for much of the 
1960’s, he maintained a minimal level of relevance.  His low-profile included meetings with 
foreign leaders while traveling and contributing to the academic foreign policy debate via an 
article in the Foreign Affairs journal,80 which certainly factored into his political comeback, given 
that the article was published just one year before his first successful run for the presidency. 
 
Nixon’s published realist perspective 
The journal Foreign Affairs served—and continues to serve—as a platform for the exchange of 
ideas among the foreign policy establishment, including scholars, policy makers, journalists, 
diplomats, directors of multinational corporations and other movers and shakers of U.S. society 
directly involved with the country’s global affairs.  Notably, the journal is not customarily found 
on the coffee tables in livings rooms across the United States; the journal does not seek an 
audience of mass appeal, but rather a contribution to the scholarly and academic debate, and is 
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most frequently found in the libraries of think tanks and universities and on the book shelves of 
professors and policy gurus. 
Entitled “Asia after Viet Nam,” Nixon certainly wanted his article to capitalize on the 
disastrous war and corresponding policies regarding Vietnam, which were primarily the work of 
two previous presidents, both from the other side of the political aisle.  Clearly, Nixon was aware 
that the public did not support the war effort, and that by appeasing the public demand for 
peace, he would enable himself to achieve electoral success in an election cycle which had been 
overtaken by the peace movement.  The challenge was to exit the war while maintaining the 
global reputation of the United States and avoiding the perception that the U.S. had “lost” and 
been defeated by the global communist coalition—to avoid the perception that the revolutionary 
forces of communism had been able to militarily trump the United States of America and its 
armed forces. 
 Like virtually all informed U.S. citizens, Nixon had realized the dramatic and negative 
impact the Vietnam War was inflicting upon the United States, and his article in Foreign Affairs 
was an articulation of how the U.S. could address that particular problem, and perhaps more 
importantly, how such a problem could be prevented in the future, especially taking into 
consideration that the Vietnam War was in many ways a repeat of the disastrous Korean War. 
 Most of the article focused on the regional role of communism in Asia and the 
corresponding policies of containment.  Much of the containment strategy regarding the global 
spread of communism is of little concern to this essay because it was both a realist and a liberal 
strategy at the same time, thus it provides little insight into how the United States and its leaders 
understood global affairs. 
 However, in his discussion about the region, Nixon clearly utilized the ideas of realism 
even without directly using the term itself.  He began by establishing the major powers of the 
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region, as a realist would.81  India, China, Japan and the United States made Nixon’s list of Asian 
powers of the near future, while the European-oriented Soviet Union did not.  The fact that he 
then analyzed the power relations among the states is evidence that he viewed the international 
system through the paradigm of realism, but one does not need to go so far to see his realist 
inclinations, which were so clearly demonstrated by his analysis.  The very fact that he set about 
defining the regional powers was itself a realist act.  Furthermore, he went on to analyze the 
regional powers via economics and armaments.  Because the Soviet economy and military was 
focused on the European theater, Nixon culled it from the list of Asian powers—a bit ironic in 
geographic comparison to the United States, which he considered to be an Asian power given its 
military relations and subsequent economic commitments concerning Korea, Vietnam, Japan and 
Taiwan.  In his view, the United States had a much more prominent role to play in Asian affairs 
than the Soviet Union did.82 
 The significance of Nixon’s realist paradigm is more greatly appreciated when one places 
it into the greater framework of international relations theory.  Although theories such as 
neoliberalism and liberal institutionalism did not fully emerge until after the Nixon era, most of 
the significant founding classical literature of the broader concepts of liberalism had already been 
written, in some cases centuries beforehand.  Liberal internationalism is itself a descendant of 
Wilsonian idealism, which had been practiced by the United States decades earlier.  Had Nixon 
conceived of Asia’s future through a liberal-idealist paradigm, he would certainly have been more 
concerned with liberal issues such as rule of law, voting, freedom of the press, free market 
economies, self-determination, education, the depth and commitment to international 
organizations, etc.  Instead of focusing on liberal issues, Nixon saw the elements of realism: 
military strength and sophistication, economic prowess and development and population scale 
and growth.  Additionally, Nixon made emphatically clear that he was concerned about the 
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realist cause of national security, while liberal concerns of global interconnectedness were often 
ignored.83 
 
Nixon’s realist foreign policies  
In addition to writing about global affairs, Nixon also had the opportunity as president to 
orchestrate the United States’ policies and relationship with the global community.  Furthermore, 
he did so with the assistance of the legendary realist, National Security Advisor and later 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.  The reason why they were able to work so closely together, 
constantly in sync with one another, was that they shared the realist paradigm of international 
relations theory, which placed premier emphasis on national security.  It is noteworthy that they 
were not concerned with the global transition to a liberal world order. 
 In what most would consider to be the United States’ most important relationship, 
Nixon displayed a true dedication to the theory of realism in dealing with the Soviet Union.  
Despite a few early set-backs in his attempt to establish an agreement concerning strategic 
armaments, Nixon was able to coerce the Soviet Union into cooperation by traveling to China.  
Of course, the trip itself was largely symbolic and a propaganda effort concerning domestic 
politics; however, what the trip symbolized has turned out to be one of the greatest turning 
points of the twentieth century.  The transition from a hostile relationship to a respectful and 
even cooperative one between the People’s Republic of China and the United States 
fundamentally began to restructure global power relations.  This was only emphasized to a 
greater extent when viewed in light of the ongoing and continually deepening Sino-Soviet split, 
including the recent border skirmish between China and the Soviet Union along the Ussuri River 
and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 in which the Soviet Union supported India while China 
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supported Pakistan.  As a realist, Nixon realized that the development of the Sino-Soviet split 
was underway, and that he could help further encourage it by siding with the Chinese.84   
Although the Cold War is often seen as being a textbook example of a bipolar 
distribution of global power, in which each the United States and the Soviet Union led their 
respective alliances of free-market democracies and Marxist societies, Nixon was hoping to 
effectively transition the bipolar international system into a tripolar one, in which China could 
separate from the monolithic communist bloc to join the United States in pressuring the Soviet 
Union into acquiescence on certain issues pertaining to global security.  It is worth noting that 
Nixon’s aim was not to weaken the communist regime of Mao in some sort of attempt to bring 
about a free market, democratic revolution.  He simply was concerned with the global power 
structure.  Having China as an ally was significant, not the liberal transition of China’s domestic 
political structure:85 realism defined Nixon’s agenda, not liberalism.   
Nixon’s relationship to China also showcases realist international theory in that he 
recognized that the United States could not indefinitely deny the legitimacy of Mao’s rule in 
China, partially because it was the world’s most populous state.  It is much easier to isolate 
smaller states than larger ones.  He knew that China had the people, the resources and the 
historical precedent to be a great global power and naturally establishing a cooperative 
relationship with such a potential power was in the national interest of the United States, despite 
the concerns of pro-liberal, anti-communist critics who preferred a policy of isolating all the 
communists.  Furthermore, Nixon had falsely believed that a good relationship with China could 
help improve the United States’ quagmire in Vietnam—as history later demonstrated, it could 
not; however, the failure of Nixon’s strategy to lessen North Vietnam and the Viet Cong’s 
ferocity does not diminish the fact that by launching such an attempt, Nixon was indeed playing 
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the game of the power politics, completely in line with the realist paradigm of international 
relations theory. 
Realism does not just explain the United States’ interactions with the big global powers, 
such as the Soviet Union and China, but it also explains the United States’ relationship with 
lesser powers, although even these relationships were sucked into the bipolar global order of the 
Cold War dynamics.  The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was briefly mentioned above as an 
important element of the Sino-Soviet split, with China maintaining its alliance with Pakistan 
while India forged a counterbalance with support from the Soviet Union.  The United States also 
played a role in the affair by siding with and supporting the Pakistanis and the Chinese, with 
whom Nixon hoped to establish a framework for further cooperation, which would in turn 
pressure the Soviet Union into cooperation as well.  However, in the conflict between India and 
Pakistan, the liberal paradigm would have prescribed the United States to assist the world’s 
largest liberal democracy, India, instead of supporting its opponent, a state governed by an 
illiberal—and some would even say genocidal—military dictator, whose action lead to the 
displacement or death of millions of citizens through a gross violation of basic human rights.  
This awkward and seemingly backwards position of the United States during the war is actually 
easy to understand given Nixon’s realist paradigm.86   
 
NIXON’S LIBERAL RHETORIC 
For someone with a clear understanding of Nixon’s firm adherence to the realist paradigm of 
international theory, a discrepancy is easily observed in many of his speeches—many, but not all.  
Sometimes when addressing the public, Nixon called upon realism, and his affinity for that 
school of thought was documented in the previous section; this section will showcase his 
rhetorical affinity for liberal internationalism.  Again, it must be remembered here that 
“liberalism” is not a part of the liberalism of the liberal/conservative, left/right or 
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Democrat/Republican binary of the U.S. political system, but rather this liberalism is the 
philosophical concept of classical liberalism applied to international relations, as outlined in the 
previous chapter of this essay. 
 Nixon’s academic writing, presidential appointments, personal thoughts and beliefs and 
some of his speeches have clearly enunciated the principles of realpolitik.  The next few pages 
will use his political speeches to demonstrate that Nixon is a great example of the discrepancy 
between the rhetoric and policy of the global affairs of the United States of America by 
showcasing some of his liberal rhetoric. 
During his failed campaign for the presidency in 1960, Nixon spoke to an audience in 
Greensboro, North Carolina.  The majority of the speech he delivered there dealt with domestic 
issues, such as the debate concerning the size, duty and responsibility of the federal bureaucracy 
in relation to the various levels of local government—as a member of the Republican Party he 
was naturally in favor of a limited federal government—but there were some lines regarding 
global affairs.  Most of the international references were of realist-inspired rhetoric about the 
strength of the military; however, the dichotomy of international relations theory did appear in a 
rather substantial manner.    In addition to the more trite calls for generic peace and aid for those 
societies struggling to establish freedom, he briefly touched upon the deeper intellectual aspects 
of liberal internationalism by saying, “We must create new instruments, and make the old ones 
more effective, for peace in the world.  I refer for, example, to the enlightened study which Duke 
University is sponsoring for developing better means of substituting the rule of law for the rule 
of force in international affairs.”87   
That the campaigner mentioned Duke University while speaking in North Carolina, the 
university’s home state, is no coincidence; those seeking to be elected often try to connect 
themselves to the local community in hopes of obtaining local votes.  Additionally, the reference 
to “rule of law” was also no coincidence.  The modern concept of liberal democracy was built 
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upon a rule of law which grants guaranteed rights to citizens in protection against the arbitrary 
whims of mayors, clergymen, the nobility, kings, emperors, dictators or other power holders.  
Without rule of law, democracy and liberalism cannot exist.88  Had that been Nixon’s only 
reference to liberalism, it could have easily been dismissed as an insignificant one-off.  However, 
it was not Nixon’s only use of liberal rhetoric. 
 
Nixon at the Republican National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida, 1968 
After losing the election and taking an eight-year hiatus from high political office, Nixon again 
ran for the presidency.  During every presidential campaign, the political parties hold a national 
convention.  Although they have ceased to be the rowdy and suspenseful nomination brawls of 
earlier U.S. history, they still hold a premier place in the political campaign, as they did during the 
Nixon era.  A political party’s national convention is the opportunity for its nominee—chosen 
beforehand by primary elections, state by state—to showcase party unity and demonstrate his89 
worthiness to be the party’s nominee.  It is also incredibly relevant because the party’s platform 
is designed and presented to the public in an effort to draw-up support in the upcoming election.  
The highlight naturally is the presidential nominee’s speech, which provides great insight into the 
candidate’s appeal to the voters.  In other words, it is U.S. presidential political rhetoric at its 
grandest. 
 On August 8, 1968, at the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach, Florida, 
presidential nominee Richard Nixon outlined to the U.S. public the reasons why they should 
vote for him.  Again, much of the speech naturally addressed domestic issues which do not 
directly concern this essay, but as the would-be head of state, commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces and premier foreign policy maker, Nixon clearly felt the need to address the nation’s 
relationship with the rest of the world. 
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 The previous section addressed Nixon’s article from Foreign Affairs, which had been 
published less than one year before the national convention speech.  Interestingly, the overt 
realism of the article barely appeared in the convention speech, but even more surprising is that 
it was replaced by some substantial references to liberal internationalism.  Admittedly, the liberal 
rhetoric of Nixon is fundamentally different from Jimmy Carter’s, which will be presented in the 
next chapter, but nonetheless, the rhetoric Nixon used during the convention speech clearly 
enunciates some of the basic principles of the liberal paradigm of international relations, while 
largely avoiding those of the realist paradigm. 
 Towards the beginning of the speech Nixon said to the people of the United States of 
America:  “The choice we make in 1968 will determine not only the future of America, but the 
future of peace and freedom in the world for the last third of the twentieth century.”90  There are 
two liberal points in that statement.  First, he connects the United States to the rest of the world.  
Some forty years after that speech was delivered, it seems to be a banal point.  Of course the 
future President of the United States would draw a connection between his country and the 
globalized world.  However, at that time, it could not be taken for granted.  Previous generations 
of U.S. citizens—especially politicians from Nixon’s own Republican Party—had been staunchly 
isolationist, up to and even during the Second World War.  Given the violently atrocious nature 
of that war and the overwhelming nature of the subsequent Korean and Vietnam Wars, there 
was a legitimate possibility that isolationism could be restored as a guiding principle of the 
foreign policy of the United States.  Nixon affirmed that if he were elected he would continue 
Eisenhower’s Republican support for engagement not isolation.91 
 Secondly, this statement links the peace and freedom of the United States to the peace 
and freedom of the world.  He notably did not mention the balance of power nor the effort to 
maximize relative power, both of which are tenets of realism.  Contrarily he mentioned “peace 
and freedom,” which are the tenets of liberalism.  However, this was not just a vague, yet vogue 
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reference to the broad concepts of peace and freedom.  He hit upon the core of international 
liberalism, which is that states can promote peace, which reinforces freedom and other liberal 
principles such as democracy and international cooperation.  The theoretical basis for the 
statement is that as a liberal state, the United States can encourage liberalism abroad, and help 
create a liberal world order.92  This contradicts the realist notion that the international system is 
and will always be entwined in a sometimes violent anarchy.93 
 Both of these interpretations of Nixon’s statement were made much clearer later in the 
speech when he said:  “What I call for is not a new isolationism.  It is a new internationalism in 
which America enlists its allies and its friends around the world in those struggles in which their 
interest is as great as ours.”94  The “new internationalism” he spoke of is really liberal 
internationalism and he is calling for the United States and its liberal democratic allies—for these 
were the only real allies at the time—to participate in a global effort to reinforce liberalism.  This 
is based upon the fact that liberal leadership in the world can foster further liberalization, but at 
the same time Nixon also acknowledged that the decline of U.S. global power had already begun 
and that it alone could not provide liberal leadership.  A team effort would be needed to 
encourage the further development of global liberalism.95 
 These were not the only liberal-inspired statements in Nixon’s national convention 
speech; and his alignment with liberalism was not just a coincidence or a use of meaningless, 
soaring political rhetoric meant to bring out the votes, but rather it was a clear, deliberate and 
reoccurring theme present throughout the speech.  Later on, Nixon said again, “I do promise 
action—a new policy for abroad; a new policy for peace and progress and justice at home.”96  
This sentence was evidence of a common theme from the speech: connecting global peace to 
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domestic peace—a reaction to the race riots and other forms of violence unfurling across the 
country at the time. 
 Another example from the speech of this theme is the statement: “We shall reestablish 
freedom from fear in America so that America can lead in reestablishing freedom from fear in 
the world.”97  Here he used the term “fear” in reference to crime and violence in America, which 
was globally, paralleled by tyranny, violence and warfare, all of which are themselves non-liberal 
elements that further inhibit the development of liberalism.  He essentially said that he believed 
that ending the chaos at home would enable the United States to further the causes of liberal 
internationalism.  He did not utilize the rhetoric of realism to say that ending chaos at home 
would increase the United States’ power within the international community; he chose to use 
liberal rhetoric, not realist rhetoric. 
 Nixon developed a different kind of theme to further illustrate his concept of America’s 
role in the international community.  He used references to light and illumination to connect the 
United States to the rest of the world in a manner consistent with liberal internationalism.  There 
are two examples of this: “And the great light shining out from America will again become a 
beacon of hope for all those in the world who seek freedom and opportunity,”98 and, “I see a day 
when our nation is at peace and the world is at peace and everyone on earth—those who hope, 
those who aspire, those who crave liberty will look to America as the shining example of hopes 
realized and dreams achieved.”99   
Both of these statements draw upon the liberal paradigm’s theory that a “virtuous circle” 
can be developed in which liberalism begets more liberalism—once liberal ideals such as peace, 
democracy, freedom and economic opportunity are established, they will encourage further 
efforts of liberalization.100  In these statements, Nixon expressed a belief that the liberalism of 
the United States will encourage liberalism elsewhere in the world.  The second statement also 
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expressed Nixon’s belief that the world can be at peace when liberalism faces no legitimate 
ideological challenge.  Such a lack of an ideological challenge to liberal democracy is Fukuyama’s 
End of History,101 while the establishment of a Perpetual Peace is Kant’s endgame vision.102  It is also 
an essentially unimaginable development according the realist paradigm and its notion of 
enduring conflict in the international system.103 
 Further into the speech Nixon reached out to his audience by connecting the generic 
idea of peace to the actual current events of the day affecting the lives of the people across the 
country:  “And I pledge to you tonight that the first priority foreign policy objective of our next 
Administration will be to bring an honorable end to the war in Vietnam.  We shall not stop 
there—we need a policy to prevent more Vietnams.”104 
 Finally, Nixon concluded his speech at the National Convention by saying to the 
audience, “The time has come for us to leave the valley of despair and climb the mountain so 
that we may see the glory of the dawn—a new day for America, and a new dawn for peace and 
freedom in the world.”105  It may at first glance seem trivial, but the fact that the last word—
Nixon’s final impression with the voters, under the campaign’s brightest spotlight—was: 
“world,” and in the context of “peace and freedom in the world.”  Although this idea could be 
consistent with the realist approach to foreign policy—the power politics of the freedom alliance 
versus global communism—the rhetoric is much more liberal than realist.  Despite Nixon’s own 
intellectual commitment to the realist dogma, one of his most important campaign speeches was 
inspired by liberal internationalism.  He chose to end his speech, which he had uncustomarily 
written himself, with an appeal to the voters’ desire for peace—an appeal to the public’s natural 
affinity for the liberal interpretation of international affairs. 
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 The realist concern with national security surely does not directly contradict any portion 
of Nixon’s speech; he did not advocate any policy, which would explicitly weaken the strategic 
interests of the United States, obviously, but nor did he advocate anything specific that was not 
relevant to national security—largely because there were few specifics mentioned.  However, it is 
the predominance of liberal rhetoric that is so intriguing.  Because his national convention 
speech was given to appeal to the widest array of people, also known as voters, Nixon 
understandably did not intellectually dig into the academic debate of global public policy—and 
because of his Foreign Affairs article he didn’t need to—he’d already done so.  Thus, despite 
having clearly realist views of foreign policy, for one of the most important speeches of his 
career till then, he quite clearly swung into the liberal paradigm.  When he addressed the 
intellectuals and the foreign policy establishment in Foreign Affairs, he utilized the realist paradigm, 
but when addressing the mass public he used the liberal paradigm.  This is the discrepancy of 
foreign policy in the United States; it is the discrepancy between realism and liberalism; policy 
and rhetoric. 
 
Nixon’s televised announcement of his trip to China, July 15, 1971 
The campaign trail was not the exclusive home of Nixon’s liberal rhetoric, it could also be found 
in numerous speeches he gave during his presidency.  This essay cannot possibly thoroughly 
analyze them all, but it is worthwhile to look into one of the most historically significant 
presidential statements of the twentieth century. 
 Nixon’s televised statement to the press on July 15, 1971, was just that: a statement; not a 
speech.  A couple of minutes were all that was necessary to deliver the message about the new 
significant distribution of global power, which is exactly what it was: a realist-inspired, carefully 
calculated, strategic move to realign the world’s most populous state—a state, which because of 
its population size and growth rate, could be the most powerful one on the globe—into a proto-
alliance for the purpose of explicitly lessening the relative power of the Soviet Union’s 
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communist bloc, the great rival of the United States.  The realist intentions behind this 
diplomatic move were previously explained above and need not be re-iterated here. 
 The public statement in which Nixon announced one of the greatest efforts of the 
United States’ realpolitik intriguingly contained no overt realist rhetoric.  He did reference the 
size of China’s population—a fact of great significance to realism,106 but not an inherently realist 
statement.  At best, the reference to China’s large population provides an insight into Nixon’s 
realist thought, but without the overt discussion of power politics.  On the other hand, liberal 
rhetoric abounds in his short statement.  He began by talking about, “our efforts to build a 
lasting peace,”107 and an “enduring peace,”108 which were certainly in line with Kant’s notion of 
the Perpetual Peace, if not a direct reference to it.  The statement’s conclusion mirrored its 
introduction with the following reference to peace: “It is in this spirit that I will undertake what I 
deeply hope will become a journey for peace.  Peace not just for our generation, but peace for 
future generations on this earth we share together.”109 
 There are two immediate interpretations of Nixon’s references to peace.  The first 
involves his status as a President of Peace.  He won the election of 1968 largely because he was able 
to obtain support from the anti-(Vietnam) War crowd, which had evolved into less of a policy 
criticism to a general movement for peace.  It had been rather easy for him to brand himself as 
the candidate of peace because the other party controlled the White House and both houses of 
the U.S. Congress while the United States military involvement in Vietnam escalated to 
unacceptable levels.  Unfortunately for Nixon and the peace movement, the withdrawal from 
Vietnam was a long, slow process.   
Nixon had promised peace, but delivered a secret expanded war in Cambodia to disrupt 
the enemies’ supply chains—a failed effort to establish peace through success.  Nixon’s 
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deliverance of more, broader warfare instead of peace in Vietnam did not bode well for his 
desire to be reelected for a second term as president.  He had already lost one presidential 
election, and as the Watergate scandal would later prove, he so desperately did not want lose to 
another one.  If a narrative of his broken promise for peace had set in, reelection would be a 
steeper uphill climb, thus he sought to prevent the establishment of such a narrative.  One 
method to do so was to seek peace someplace else, someplace bigger, someplace unexpected: 
China—the People’s Republic of China, to be more specific.  Nixon hoped the perception of 
failure concerning Vietnam and its ensuing disappointment and certain electoral rejection could 
be counterbalanced by peace with Peking.  Thus, Nixon had a vested interest in a narrative of 
peace—a liberal narrative. 
 However, there is another interpretation of Nixon’s fixation on peace, and it has little to 
do with domestic politics.  Global peace is the guiding light of the Kantian peace triangle, along 
with its corresponding paradigm of international relations theory: liberal internationalism—as 
was discussed in the previous chapter.  Diplomatic relations are among the most prominent tools 
used for expanding the reach of liberalism.  Remember, democracy, economic exchange and 
international organizations are the three points of the Kantian peace triangle and the main tenets 
of liberal internationalism.110  The democratization of such a strongly communist state is 
generally a long, difficult process, and there is no indication that Nixon legitimately hoped to 
bring democracy with him to China.  The other two ideas were enshrined in the new attitude 
regarding China: the beginning of trade relations and the China seat at United Nations Security 
Council being transferred to the People’s Republic.  These specific policies were not directly 
mentioned in Nixon’s announcement, but they would certainly be the result of “normal 
relations,”111 as history has demonstrated to be the case.  However, Nixon did specifically say, 
“All nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United 
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States and the People’s Republic of China.”112  By that statement, Nixon implied that the global 
community would benefit from peace between the United States and the People’s Republic, as 
does the liberal paradigm of international relations. 
 Nixon also said, “It [the new relationship] is not directed against any other nation.”113  
Here Nixon was anticipating the criticism of his realpolitik and denying it.  The denial—a 
common theme of Nixon’s presidency for other, more scandalous reasons—is of course 
contradicted by the fact that he used this relationship with China to unsettle the Soviet Union 
enough that it would ultimately agree to an arms reduction treaty.114 
 Certainly both of the aforementioned dynamics—appeasing the public’s demand for 
peace and international liberalism’s policy prescriptions—were at play in Nixon’s announcement 
address regarding his trip to China.  The domestic reasons for seeking peace complement the 
liberal foreign policy rhetoric.  Time Magazine’s cover illustration—a political cartoon featuring 
Nixon and Kissinger in a patriotic boat with the phrase: “To Peking for Peace,”115—indicates not 
only that the usually hostile media had adopted Nixon’s desired interpretation of the event, but 
also the power of presidential rhetoric.  If the president’s words and rhetorical style were 
irrelevant, then the rest of society would disregard them.  However, Nixon’s liberal rhetoric 
regarding his trip to China became the narrative.  By framing his trip to China in liberal rhetoric 
from the get-go, he was also able to establish the narrative.  In essence, his propaganda effort 
had worked flawlessly. 
 Based upon the facts surrounding the event, Time Magazine could have easily justified a 
headline of “To Peking to Pressure Moscow,” or “To Peking to Restructure the Global 
Distribution of Power,” but it did not.  The editors followed the lead of the president’s liberal 
rhetoric.  The fact that Nixon was perceived as a president bringing peace to the world 
                                                 
112 NixonFoundation, “President Nixon announces trip to China.” 
113 NixonFoundation, “President Nixon announces trip to China.” 
114 Edward Kolodziej, “Foreign Policy and the Politics of Interdependence: The Nixon Presidency,” Polity 9, no. 2 
(1976) 145. 
115 Cover illustration, Time, 26 July 1971, as viewed at 
http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19710726,00.html. 
  
   
 
73 
 
potentially reconciled his failures in the Vietnam War which could have derailed his attempt for 
reelection.  In the trip to China, it was beneficial for the president to be perceived as a man of 
peace, prosperity and cooperation; it was beneficial for him to adopt the mantra of the liberal 
paradigm of international relations theory.  Only broader research and a deeper analysis could 
properly determine if his trip to China would have captivated the U.S. public and allowed the 
president to seem so peaceful in the Vietnam era if it had been framed as an attempt to rearrange 
the global balance of power, to transform the bipolar system into a potentially tripolar one, or an 
attempt to establish leverage to use against the Soviet Union during arms limitations negotiations.  
Would the rhetoric of realpolitik have been as effective and achieved the same results 
domestically as the liberal rhetoric did?  Probably not. 
  
RECONCILING NIXON’S REALISM AND LIBERALISM 
This essay is seeking to reconcile or at least develop some sort of understanding of the apparent 
discrepancy of foreign policy and its rhetoric, and the conflicts of interest between the 
international relations theories of realism and liberalism.  The previous two sections of this 
chapter have demonstrated that U.S. President Richard Nixon not only found intellectual 
inspiration in the realist paradigm of international relations theory, but he also contributed to the 
scholarly field—via his article in Foreign Affairs—and implemented a set of corresponding policies 
regarding the United States’ relationship with China, the Soviet Union, Pakistan and India, as 
well as others.  On the other hand, Nixon drew upon the liberal paradigm of international 
relations theory as a candidate on the campaign trail and as president, discussing his desire for 
peace, friendship and cooperation around the world.  The apparent contradiction between 
conducting a realist foreign policy while discussing it in liberal terms can actually be easily 
explained.  Although John Mearsheimer did not explicitly discuss the Nixon case in his book 
about realism, he did address the basic notion of the United States being attracted to liberalism 
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while utilizing realism in its foreign policy.116  Nixon was clearly no exception to Mearsheimer’s 
concept. 
 Despite the fact that the general public discourse does not recognize the discrepancy, the 
foreign policy establishment duly does.  Mearsheimer’s observation of the general discrepancy 
has already been addressed, but he is not the only one who has recognized this phenomenon.  A 
member of Nixon’s own administration has also written explicitly about Nixon’s discrepancy in 
foreign policy and its rhetoric.  In addition to providing several additional examples of Nixon’s 
liberal rhetoric—or its closely related cousin “Wilsonian idealism”—Henry Kissinger provided 
an explanation of Nixon’s dichotomy117 that directly parallels Mearsheimer’s general description 
of U.S. society.118  According to Kissinger, both the public of the United States and Richard 
Nixon preferred the liberal paradigm and its vision of a world where peace and freedom reign 
supreme.  Both were drawn to the positive vision of humanity and global affairs, while 
acknowledging and accepting the role of the United States as a leader of liberalism and its global 
enlightenment. 
 However, realism showcases the difference between the U.S. public and Nixon.  While 
the public dislikes realism and most everything it represents,119 Nixon had an essentially realist 
understanding of the world:  he believed that ideology should not trump national security, as it 
had under the containment strategy, particularly in Vietnam.  He also believed in the balance of 
power theory—a key component of the realist paradigm.120  As president, Nixon ultimately 
combined the two approaches.  In an effort to connect with the public and express his own 
idealism he used liberal rhetoric to discuss his realist policies based upon national interest and the 
implementation of a global balance of power, as evidenced by his policy of establishing a 
relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China to balance the threat 
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of the Soviet Union and the global spread of communism.121  Nixon clearly expressed such a 
belief to foreign affairs columnist and author C. L. Sulzberger during an interview in 1986: 
It is very important to have in mind that we live in a world of power politics [“realism”].  
On the other hand, Americans do not like power politics.  We never have.  We are 
dragged into it against our will.  For Americans to support any foreign policy initiative, it 
must be cast in idealistic terms.  Wilson, for example, talked about making the world safe 
for democracy.  That was in his mind.  And a lot of Americans believe that was also the 
case when they walked in and supported World War II. … I think  at the present time it 
is very important for the United States in its position of leadership to cast its role not just 
in terms of balance of power, arms control, etcetera, but in idealistic terms.  That is why I 
think it is very important that despite the traditional unpopularity of foreign involvement, 
Americans respond to a positive initiative.  They should see that we’re not just spending 
all this money to defend ourselves and all the rest, but that we want peace for ourselves 
and everybody else too.  …  Of course, a good dose of idealism exists in American 
foreign policy.  We should practice power politics because that’s the way the world is.  
But it must be cast in idealistic terms in order to get people to support it.122 
Clearly, Nixon himself was aware and readily admits that he was conducting realist foreign policy, 
while using liberalism to sell it to the public.  His more cynical critics would find this to be 
natural given his lies surrounding the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War; however, this 
dichotomy of foreign policy was not just another sinister, deceitful element of the conniving 
“Tricky Dick,” but rather a condition of the U.S. presidency and a response to public sentiment.  
The next chapter will outline how even the sweetheart of the liberals, Jimmy Carter, at the other 
end of the political spectrum, was fundamentally no different in his approach to foreign policy. 
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Chapter IV 
Case Study: Jimmy Carter 
 
One cannot reach an understanding of the discrepancy between liberal rhetoric and the realist 
agenda of U.S. foreign policy without considering James Carter, who governed the United States 
of America as the 40th President from 1977-1981.  President Carter is crucial to understanding 
how the rhetoric of liberal foreign policy works in the United States because he is widely 
acknowledged as a champion of peace, human rights and other liberal notions of foreign 
policy.123  
 When looking into the discrepancy between foreign policy rhetoric and reasoning, the 
presidency of Jimmy Carter provides an excellent case study.  Because he is seen as being a clear 
“liberal”—in terms of foreign policy, not necessarily “liberal” in regards to the American political 
spectrum—he is the one who would least likely have used realist reasoning in his foreign policies.  
If the actions and actual foreign policies of presidents matched their rhetoric, then Jimmy 
Carter’s actions should show only at most a minor influence from the realist paradigm, and 
should instead indicate the liberal paradigm’s influence on his foreign policies.  Thus, if one can 
demonstrate that the (rhetorically) least realist president was heavily influenced by realism, one 
can reasonably assume that the institution of U.S. foreign policy is heavily influenced by the 
realist paradigm, and that it does not simply influence a few presidents once in a while, but rather 
the system as a whole.  To state this concept more succinctly, if Jimmy Carter, the most “liberal” 
foreign policy maker was in fact greatly informed by realism, then the United States, regardless of 
its leader and his or her rhetoric, is primarily a realist actor within the international system. 
 However, before making the case that Carter made realist foreign policy despite his 
liberal rhetoric, the exercise of demonstrating his liberal rhetoric should be completed.  But it 
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will be useful to begin with a brief explanation of how and why Carter stands out as being so 
liberal—specifically one should be aware of the political circumstances which brought a liberal to 
the White House, where he was responsible for orchestrating U.S. foreign policy.   
  
Carter and the Watergate Effect 
Given the nature of democracy and the choices it presents, it is very difficult to ever draw 
concrete conclusions from parties, proposals or even candidates in isolation.  Unlike the regimes 
of dictators, authoritarians and absolute monarchs, successful democratic regimes are 
characterized by electoral choices, and thus a plethora of influences ranging from ideologies to 
parties to leaders.  Therefore, one can only analyze Jimmy Carter, his administration and his 
foreign policies by having at least some understanding of their context.  In the case of Carter’s 
liberal ideas of foreign policy this is particularly relevant given the zeitgeist and political dynamics 
of the time. 
 As a result of one of the greatest scandals in U.S. political history—Watergate—Richard 
Nixon felt the need to resign from the presidency, given the public outrage and anger.  Nixon’s 
vice president, Gerald Ford, then became the president of the United States of America.  Despite 
his lack of direct involvement in the Watergate scandal, as the highest ranking member of 
Nixon’s administration, his credibility, and more importantly, the credibility of the political party 
he represented, was tarnished.  So disgusted was the public with the way Washington politicians 
conducted themselves, anyone associated with the establishment was seen in a negative light.  The 
first presidential election to follow the Watergate Scandal was the election of 1976, in which 
Jimmy Carter ultimately defeated the incumbent Gerald Ford, who had served as president for 
two and a half years. 
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 A very basic understanding of Watergate and its fallout, particularly the public’s disgust 
with Washington’s political culture, not only explains how and why Carter won the election124, 
but why his foreign policy rhetoric departed so significantly from that of the Nixon/Ford 
administration.  One of Carter’s main traits that appealed to the people of the United States was 
his status as an outsider.125  As a politician he had served the State of Georgia from 1961 to 1966 
as a State Senator and from 1971 to 1975 as Governor.  His involvement with Georgia’s politics 
instead of the federal politics of the nation’s capital meant that he was untainted by the political 
culture of corruption in Washington, DC, while his laid-back and charming manner—much 
more typical of the deep South than the elitist Northeast—gave him the aura of an “outsider” 
and thus the appeal that helped him win the nomination of the Democratic Party.126  This is 
significant because as a successful outsider, he was freed from the conventional wisdom, 
including the conventional wisdom in regards to management style and policy-making.  The 
appeal of his “outsider-ness” allowed him to forge a new course in many policy areas, including 
foreign policy.  Thus, the scandalous nature of Watergate and the desire to turn a new page in 
U.S. politics allowed an outsider, such as Jimmy Carter to campaign for the presidency upon a 
rather new platform.  By abandoning the Washington consensus he was also able to abandon 
Washington’s often overt realpolitik and focus instead on liberal issues such as human rights and 
world peace. 
 
CARTER’S LIBERAL RHETORIC 
As a sub-federal political leader from Georgia, Jimmy Carter had never needed to consider 
foreign policy issues because the federal institutions of Washington, D.C. have the exclusive 
prerogative in international affairs.  Thus, while being an outsider was beneficial to Carter 
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regarding domestic concerns about the national political culture, being a Washington outsider 
was disadvantageous for Carter in the sense that he had no experience with foreign policy and no 
connections to the foreign policy establishment, although this certainly did not hinder him 
politically in 1976.  Additionally challenging his policy credentials was the foundation of his 
political philosophy, which had brought him great success in Georgia, where his Christian faith 
had led him to conclude that the previous racial policies typical of the south were amoral.  His 
biblically-inspired commitments to the pro-life and civil rights movements didn’t have an 
automatic correlation in the realm of foreign policy.127  Of course, given that the U.S. president 
plays such a crucial role in the nation’s foreign policy, any presidential candidate must address 
international issues and explain to the public what his or her basic approach to foreign policy 
would be if elected to the presidency. 
 
Carter’s campaign speech to the Foreign Policy Association 
As the presidential campaign progressed, the need for Carter to explain his foreign policy 
philosophy grew.  In June of 1976, as his campaign for the nomination of the Democratic Party 
began to shift to the general election strategy, he delivered a speech entitled “A Community of 
the Free” to the Foreign Policy Association in New York City.  Of course, this was not just a 
random speech by a presidential hopeful, but rather his attempt to persuade the foreign policy 
establishment that he, a retired peanut farmer, was capable of representing the United States of 
America to the rest of the world as its head of state, and also literate enough in foreign affairs to 
create policies that would deeply impact the U.S., as well as its international friends and foes.  
The general precariousness of the Cold War only heightened the concerns of the time. 
 In his speech to the Foreign Policy Association one can easily observe both his 
willingness and desire to shift the U.S. from a realist-inspired state to a liberal-inspired one, 
especially in the following excerpt:  
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In the area of foreign policy, our people are troubled, confused, and sometimes angry.  
There has been too much emphasis on transient spectaculars and too little on substance.  
We are deeply concerned, not only by such obvious tragedies as the war in Vietnam, but 
by the more subtle erosion in the focus and the morality of our foreign policy. 
Under the Nixon-Ford Administration, there has evolved a kind of secretive “Lone 
Ranger” foreign policy—a one-man policy of international adventure.  This is not an 
appropriate policy for America. 
We have sometimes tried to play other nations one against another instead of organizing 
free nations to share world responsibility to collective action.  We have made highly 
publicized efforts to woo the major communist powers while neglecting our natural 
friends and allies.  A foreign policy based on secrecy inherently has had to be closely 
guarded and amoral, and we have had to forgo openness, consultation, and a constant 
adherence to fundamental principles and high moral standards.128 
In the second paragraph of this excerpt, he made a direct reference to the Nixon-Ford 
administration while characterizing it as a realist policy maker.  The “secretive Lone Ranger” is a 
reference to the realist concern with a state’s self-interest and willingness to conduct unilateral 
foreign policy.  Within the principles of realism, states deal with the uncertainty of anarchy by 
looking out for their own security and understanding that only they can protect themselves from 
the conflict and devastation in the world.  This concept often manifests itself when states, 
particularly the most powerful ones, take actions to achieve their own goals without depending 
upon the greater global community to protect their interests.129  This speech, like virtually all 
campaign speeches in the United States, is full of vague ideas and thus it is difficult to know to 
what exactly this was a reference, but, as explained earlier in this essay, President Nixon and his 
foreign policy advisor Henry Kissinger were infamous for running U.S. foreign policy on their 
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own, with little help from outsiders.  So in this case, Carter’s Lone Ranger was the realist 
philosophy of the administration’s foreign policy dynamic duo: Nixon and Kissinger, whom 
many critics accused of implementing overly aggressive, unilateral, realist foreign policies, which 
Carter criticizes, thus implying his disdain for a philosophy of foreign policy that could be called 
Nixonian realism. 
 The above excerpt’s third paragraph attacks realism’s use of shifting alliances to create a 
balance of power instead of utilizing more global organizational structures to foster peace and 
stability.  Carter went on to criticize Nixon’s reconciliation with illiberal China and claimed that 
the liberal allies of the U.S. were “neglected.”130 
 Further into the speech, Carter said: 
We simply must have an international policy of democratic leadership, and we must stop 
trying to play a game of power politics.  We must evolve and consummate our foreign 
policy openly and frankly.  There must be bipartisan harmony and collaboration between 
the President and the Congress, and we must re-establish a spirit of common purpose 
among democratic nations.131 
 In the first sentence of the above passage, where Carter said, “We must stop trying to 
play a game of power politics,” he directly refers to realism’s centralizing focus: the relative 
power among states and their manipulation of it,132 and says that in its regard that “we must 
stop.”  In his statement, Carter essentially said that the U.S. must abandon realist-inspired 
foreign policies.  He then described what should replace realism: liberalism—“we must re-
establish a spirit of common purpose among democratic nations.”133  The focus on democracy 
and its promotion in the world is a liberal idea, and goes against the grain of realism.134 
 Carter continued his pro-liberal rhetoric: 
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We need to consider how, in addition to alliances that were formed in years past for 
essentially military purposes, we might develop broader arrangements for dealing with 
such problems as the arms race and world poverty and the allocation of resources.  The 
time has come for us to seek a partnership between North America, Western Europe, 
and Japan.  Our three regions share economic, political and security concerns that make 
it logical that we should seek ever-increasing unity and understanding.135 
 His reference to “alliances formed for military purposes” is an acknowledgement of 
existing realist alliances—left-over from previous wars.  Although he does not want to abolish 
them, he does want to reform them along liberal lines to deal with “the arms race and world 
poverty and the allocation of resources.”136  This passage focuses on the use of alliances, which 
can be both realist and liberal—the difference is in how and why an alliance would be created, 
maintained, utilized and ultimately terminated.  Thus, rhetoric concerning alliances in general is 
inherently neither realist nor liberal.  However, Carter did describe his intentions for these 
alliances, which enables one to infer which paradigm of international relations theory he prefers.  
He stated three objectives for his alliances; the first was to deal with the arms race.  Again, this 
could go either realist or liberal.  If the multilateral solution to the arms race were to increase U.S. 
military power relative to the other great powers, then, dealing with the arms race would be a 
realist foreign policy; however, if the multilateral solution to the arms race were to decrease U.S. 
military power relative to the global powers, then, it would go against realist logic but may or 
may not still be liberal.  A liberal solution to the arms race would likely include international 
organizations to enforce a minimal level of arms in an effort to reduce global armament and thus 
also reduce the risk and devastation from global conflicts, in an effort to promote a perpetual peace. 
 The second of Carter’s proposals for alliances was to solve “world poverty.”  Aside from 
being an enormously high goal, ending global poverty is also a clearly non-realist goal.  
Admittedly, there could be a few instances where reducing poverty would serve the realist 
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interest in national security.  For example, a realist would say to the United States that combating 
poverty in Mexico may be worthwhile if it would create a more stable society, a more 
cooperative ally and a safer border between the two states.  But even that is a bit of a stretch for 
realism.  Other examples occurred around the globe during the Cold War when the United States 
provided financial assistance to the states that actively opposed communism and its spread, but 
any serious realist would readily admit that the purpose of such aid served primarily militaristic 
strategic objectives and directly opposed the forces that most greatly threatened the security of 
the U.S.  Liberals always want to reduce poverty; a realist does, only when it is in the national 
interest to do so.137  Realists are not overtly concerned with poverty—as Jimmy Carter was—
until it becomes a threat to national security, unlike liberals who often view poverty in a more 
moral sense, as Carter did.138 
 When Carter spoke about global poverty in this speech, he did not attach it to any 
concept of power, strategy or security; he did not connect poverty to realism or a national 
interest.  Generally, when Carter spoke of poverty, he spoke from the perspective of human 
compassion.  Before running for the presidency, Carter had been a politician and governor of the 
state of Georgia, where poverty was abundant and often associated with racial issues and a lack 
of equal rights and even a neglect of human rights.  Along with being a champion of racial 
integration and equality, he spoke out against poverty, which played a crucial role in race 
relations throughout the South.139  Thus, Carter was well known for taking an active stand 
against poverty, which had led him to success in Georgia.  It is not surprising then that during 
his run for the presidency he took his old platform from his days in Georgia’s political scene and 
applied it to the greater world as his would-be presidential foreign policy.  As the governor of 
Georgia, he was deeply opposed to social injustice and poverty; as a candidate for the presidency 
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he also opposed injustice and poverty.  The transition was logical—all poverty is bad, in his view, 
and should be ended.  This notion is quite consistent with the goals of liberalism, but not realism. 
 The final purpose for Carter’s international alliances of the future was to “allocate 
resources,” which at first seems to straddle the border between global liberalism and some sort 
of global socialist or even communist idea.  Or this could have been simply a reiteration of his 
opposition to global poverty; however, when one tailors Carter’s idea of using international 
alliances (or loosely arranged international organizations) to promote trade to the U.S. and its 
specific place within the global economy, one realizes that the U.S. is a resource-rich country, 
especially in regards to agricultural products.  Thus, the promotion of global trade serves the U.S. 
national interest, something any realist could appreciate.  However, realists would never want to 
be dependent upon the cooperation of the international community for its procurement of 
resources.  Classical liberals such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo were staunch believers in 
international trade, while contemporary liberals believe that participation in international 
organizations, which promote trade, can reduce conflict.  The idea of using international alliances 
and organizations to facilitate trade seems more liberal than realist. 
 Furthermore, there is the issue of fossil fuels.  Carter’s campaign for the presidency took 
place between the two great oil crises in the United Sates.  Thus, he was campaigning in an era 
that had already experienced one oil shock and was well aware that another could transpire, 
leading to many great concerns about the global availability of cheap crude oil.  Thus Carter’s 
liberal line about using global alliances to allocate resources could also be interpreted as an 
attempt to use the nation’s alliances to ensure the U.S. would have easy access to natural 
resources, including global sources of petroleum, which is not only a particular resource the U.S. 
cannot function without, but also one for which the U.S. was increasingly relying upon foreign 
sources.  Looking out for the national interest is also a realist objective.  Using alliances to ensure 
U.S. access to petroleum is both a liberal and realist objective; however, Carter’s rhetoric about it 
  
   
 
85 
 
is decidedly more liberal than realist, given his emphasis on multilateral cooperation, not the 
national interest and strategic objectives. 
 Carter mentioned yet another aspect of liberalism during his speech to the Foreign Policy 
Association when he proposed a grand intercontinental/global alliance of states which happen to 
be the world’s most stable democracies.  He said that this alliance should be created for 
“economic, political and security concerns.”140  This is clearly part of a liberal agenda.  The main 
concept of liberalism is that democratic states will create international organizations and 
economic interdependence to foster greater peace and prosperity.141  This line from Carter’s 
speech simply explains which states will start the cycle, and its no coincidence that he chose to 
mention the world’s most democratic regions.  And finally, his notion of “unity and 
understanding”142 is definitely more in keeping with the liberal concept of states coming together 
in peace than it is with realpolitik’s power maximization and manipulation in pursuit of the 
national interest. 
 In the end, Jimmy Carter summed up his views on foreign policy by saying to the 
Foreign Policy Association:  
What I do have is a strong sense that this country is drifting and must have new 
leadership and new direction.  The time has come for a new direction.  The time has 
come for a new thrust of creativity in foreign policy … The time has come for a new 
architectural effort … with peace and justice its constant goal.143 
 Carter’s belief that the U.S. should restructure its foreign policy for “peace and justice”144 
is simplistic, but at the same time quite profound.  First, he is saying that the U.S. needs a new 
approach: that the previous reign of realpolitik needs to end.  Then he suggests that a more 
liberal “goal” of “peace and justice” should be pursued.  Again, just to make clear, most 
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reasonable realists would like to see a world of peace and justice; however, they accept the 
anarchy of the global order, understand the threat it imposes upon national security and utilize 
the power relations of states to maximize and ensure the stability, longevity, prosperity and 
security of the state.  Realists do not believe that peace and justice will triumph in the world of 
anarchy, and thus do not focus upon it, whereas liberals do believe that the ultimate global peace 
can be achieved.145  In his speech, Carter outlined how and why the U.S. should fundamentally 
shift its global strategy from one based upon the realist perspective to one based upon the liberal 
perspective. 
 
Carter’s commencement address to the graduates of the University of Notre Dame 
Every year, as the spring season approaches in the United States, colleges and universities 
scramble to recruit the most prestigious members of the U.S.—and even the global—community 
to give the commencement address during their graduation ceremonies.  Naturally, as one of the 
most prominent individuals in American society, presidents are highly sought after speakers, and 
as president, Jimmy Carter could easily have spoken at any number of institutions.  A few 
months after being sworn in as president, Carter went to the University of Notre Dame to 
deliver the commencement speech.  There are certainly many things to be said about him going 
to Notre Dame—primarily centered around Carter’s strong identity as an evangelical Christian 
and Notre Dame’s affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church—but these are not the concern 
of this essay, although the Christian connection of the university and Carter’s inspiration for 
policy is noteworthy.  However, this commencement address is relevant to this essay because it 
was primarily about foreign policy, which admittedly is a bit odd for a commencement speech, 
but nonetheless, the speech provides great insight into Carter’s foreign policy and is clearly an 
example of his liberal rhetoric. 
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 At the beginning of his speech, Carter established his notion of liberal foreign policy by 
saying: 
I want to speak to you today about the strands that connect our actions oversees with 
our essential character as a nation.  I believe we can have a foreign policy that is 
democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, 
which we have, for humane purposes. … We can reject the arguments of those rulers 
who deny human rights to their people.  We are confident that democracy’s example will 
be compelling, and so we seek to bring that example close to those from whom in the 
past few years we have been separated and who are not yet convinced about the 
advantages of our kind of life. … Democracy’s great recent successes—in India, Portugal, 
Spain, Greece—show that our confidence in this system is not misplaced.  Being 
confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism 
which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.  I’m glad that’s 
being changed.146 
 Carter’s belief that the U.S. can have a democratic, values-based foreign policy which 
uses its power for humane purposes147 is essentially the definition of the liberal paradigm of 
international relations theory.148  Furthermore, Carter’s rejection of international leaders who 
disregard human rights is a diversion from the realist approach, since a realist foreign policy 
strategy would not place such a matter at the foundation of a state’s foreign policy.  Realism does 
not deny actions intended to defend human rights; however, it would only condone such actions 
if there was no jeopardy to the broader national interest.  For a realist, the national interest 
always comes first, regardless of human rights concerns.149 
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 The last line of the above excerpt is worth repeating again:  “We are now free of that 
inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that 
fear.”150  The “embrace” that Carter spoke of is the willingness to form alliances with illiberal 
regimes, such as that of Chile’s Augusto Pinochet, among others.  In this statement Carter 
acknowledged that the United States had previously formed alliances which do not support the 
globalization of liberal principles; essentially these alliances of which he spoke were formed for 
strategic reasons for the sake of greater national security—in other words, they were foreign 
policies based upon realism.  This statement was quite important not only because he recognized 
the previous realism of U.S. foreign policy—as the previous chapter of this thesis explored—but 
also because he said, “we are now free of that.”151  Although he did not explicitly state that the 
United States would transition from a realist foreign policy to a liberal one, an in-depth analysis 
of his words makes that intention emphatically clear.  Given that the Notre Dame 
Commencement speech was delivered in the beginning of his presidency, the obvious question 
that comes to mind is:  How successful was Carter in reorienting the foreign policy of the United 
States from realism to liberalism? 
 However, before answering that question, Carter’s commitment to the liberal rhetoric of 
foreign policy should be further demonstrated.  The three thousand words of the Notre Dame 
Commencement speech did not contain a mere trite reference to international liberalism, but 
rather it was the main thesis of the speech.  Carter took the opportunity in an early part of his 
presidential term to explain his religiously inspired morally liberal paradigm of international 
relations at one of the most prominent religious institutions in the United States, which further 
emphasized that his approach to foreign policy was based upon his religiously inspired views of 
morality, equality and human rights, instead of the dirty realpolitik of his predecessors.  It is not 
necessary to thoroughly analyze all such liberal points in his speech; they all harmoniously 
complement one another in expressing Carter’s liberal views on foreign policy—or at least they 
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demonstrate his liberal rhetoric on the matter.  Here are some of the liberal highlights from the 
Notre Dame Commencement address:152  
 “Our policy … was guided by two principles: a belief that Soviet expansion was almost 
inevitable but that it must be contained and the corresponding belief in the importance 
of an almost exclusive alliance among non-communist nations on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  That system could not last forever unchanged. 
 “We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global 
questions of justice, equity and human rights. 
 “We have reaffirmed America’s commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of 
our foreign policy. 
 “You may be interested in knowing that at this NATO meeting, for the first time in 
more than 25 years, all members are democracies.  Even more important, all of us 
reaffirmed our basic optimism in the future of the democratic system.  Our spirit of 
confidence is spreading.  Together, our democracy can help to shape the wider 
architecture of global cooperation. 
 “[The arms race is] morally deplorable. 
 “We set in motion an international effort to determine the best ways of harnessing 
nuclear energy. 
 “But all this I’ve described is just the beginning.  It’s a beginning aimed towards a clear 
goal: to create a wider framework of international cooperation suited to the new and 
rapidly changing historical circumstances. 
 “We will cooperate more closely with the newly influential countries in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia.  We need their friendship in a common effort as the structure of world 
power changes. 
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 “The western democracies, the OPEC nations, and the developed communist countries 
can cooperate through existing international institutions in providing more effective aid.  
This is an excellent alternative to war. 
 “Although these are our close friends [“nations in this hemisphere”] and neighbors, our 
links with them are the same links of equality that we forge for the rest of the world.  We 
will be dealing with them as part of a new, worldwide mosaic of global, regional and 
bilateral relations. 
 “We see … China as a key force for global peace.  We wish to cooperate closely … 
 “Let me conclude by summarizing:  Our policy is based on a historical vision of 
America’s role.  Our policy is derived from a larger view of global change.  Our policy is 
rooted in our moral values, which never change.  Our policy is reinforced by our material 
wealth and by our military power.  Our policy is designed to serve mankind.  And it is a 
policy that I hope will make you proud to be Americans.” 
Although Carter never specifically used terms such as “liberal theories of international 
relations” or “Kantian system,” these concepts certainly provided the analytical tools and 
conceptual framework that created the speech.  Democracy and international cooperation were 
repeatedly mentioned as ways to increase peace, morality and human rights.  Jimmy Carter clearly 
used the liberal paradigm of international relations to develop his foreign policy rhetoric, as 
evidenced by his commencement address to the graduates and audience of the University of 
Notre Dame.   
It is crucial to remember that the previous pages merely present an analysis of rhetoric, and 
that there is a significant difference in analyzing what one says versus what one does.  This has 
been an analysis of what Carter said on the campaign trail and early in his presidency which may 
or may not give an indication of the policies he crafted as president.  The words of any leader, or 
in fact any person, may or may not correspond to their actions.  In seeking to understand the 
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apparent discrepancy between foreign policy and its rhetoric one must analyze each separately.   
With the above analysis of Carter’s rhetoric in mind, it is time to turn to his actual policies. 
 
CARTER AND THE TWO CHINAS 
Given this essay’s previous discussion about U.S. President Richard Nixon and his revolutionary 
diplomatic breakthrough with China—a historic visit by a U.S. president—it only makes sense to 
follow through and cross the partisan divide of U.S. political culture and see how Jimmy 
Carter—a member of the political system’s other major party—dealt with the continuation of 
Nixon’s China policies. 
 As previously mentioned, in his speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York 
City during his campaign for the presidency, Carter spoke out against Nixon’s realist approach to 
China: 
We have sometimes tried to play other nations one against another instead of organizing 
free nations to share world responsibilities in collective action.  We have made highly 
publicized efforts to woo the major communist powers while neglecting our natural 
friends and allies.  A foreign policy based on secrecy inherently has had to be closely 
guarded and amoral, and we have had to forgo openness, consultation, and a constant 
adherence to fundamental principles and high moral standards.153 
Although this was another candidate’s vague approach to policy, it seems clear, with a little 
intuition, that he was addressing the U.S. relations with the communist states when he said: “… 
play other nations against one another instead of organizing free nations …” This is certainly a 
reference to Nixon’s move to weaken the relative power of the Soviet Union by replacing it as 
the most powerful ally of the world’s most populous state, China. 
There is of course the chance that he was referring to other instances or at least bundling 
up several scenarios into one generalized statement.  For example, the “the secrecy” could have 
                                                 
153 Carter “A Community of the Free,” 115. 
  
   
 
92 
 
been a reference to the policies of the Vietnam War in which supply chains in neighboring 
countries were certainly attacked.  However, this speech was given during his campaign for the 
presidency against Gerald Ford, who had continued and expanded Nixon’s policies toward 
China, while putting an end to the Vietnam War once and for all.  Given the competitive nature 
of U.S. presidential campaigns, it is highly unlikely that Carter would have wanted to remind 
anyone of the disastrous policies that began the unpopular Vietnam War during two previous 
administrations headed by the Democratic Party, to which Carter himself belonged.  Thus it is 
much more likely that he was addressing the relationship with China in this portion of his speech. 
 Although Nixon’s trip to China did not transform China into a democratic republic in 
the image of the United States, it did effectively end the Soviet Union’s political and economic 
influence over China.154  In his speech Carter criticized this method of conducting foreign 
policy—using China to weaken the Soviet Union—by saying that the United States should rather 
focus on “organizing free nations to share world responsibility in collective action.”155  He 
implied that it was wrong to enter into a diplomatic relationship with a state that restricts 
freedom.  Carter made the case that the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford administration and foreign policy 
team and its realist policies should be ended in favor of his more liberal, free-democratic-centric 
approach to U.S. foreign policy. 
 Two and a half years later—about two years after taking the oath of office—President 
Jimmy Carter issued the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on January I, 1979.  It 
is interesting that after being so critical of Nixon’s China policy, he chose to take it one step 
further.  Carter’s communiqué said, in reference to the United States and China: “Neither should 
seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is 
                                                 
154 James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York 1998) 
35. 
155 Carter “A Community of the Free,” 115. 
  
   
 
93 
 
opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.”156  
This pledge is a direct contradiction of what a realist state would do,157 and thus indicates that 
not only would the U.S. end its realist tradition, but that it also believes China will no longer 
engage the world as a realist actor. 
 Carter went on in the communiqué to say, “We do not undertake this important step for 
transient tactical or expedient reasons.”158  The previous chapter of this essay already explained 
Nixon’s “tactical” and “expedient reasons” for establishing diplomatic relations with China.  
Such reasons were clearly present, and by denying such claims in the communiqué, he essentially 
acknowledges that there were “tactical” and “expedient reasons” for creating ties with China and 
that these reasons did not motivate him, but rather the opportunity to pursue his liberal foreign 
policy agenda, including the pursuit of world peace.  It is quite clear that Carter was distancing 
himself rhetorically from the ideology of realist international relations, while explaining the 
continuation and expansion of a realist-inspired foreign policy. 
After distancing himself and his China policy from realism, through his rhetoric, Carter 
then gave clear confirmation of his liberal, global peace-promoting agenda: 
To strengthen and expedite the benefits of this new relationship between China and the 
United States, I am pleased to announce that Vice Premier Teng has accepted my 
invitation and will visit Washington at the end of January.  His visit will give our 
Governments the opportunity to consult with each other on global issues and to begin 
working together to enhance the cause of world peace.159 
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Carter went on to acknowledge his predecessors, perhaps to indicate that the strategic 
reasoning behind the initiative truly belonged to them and not to him and his peace agenda, by 
saying that the new relationship with China was an “effort of our own country to build a world 
in which peace will be the goal and the responsibility of all nations.”160 
 Carter concluded the Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
between the United States and China with the following paragraph: “The normalization of 
relations between the United States and China has no other purpose than this: the advancement 
of peace.  It is in this spirit, at this season of peace that I take special pride in sharing this good 
news with you tonight.”161  If there had been a doubt in anyone’s mind, this closing statement’s 
purpose was to clarify once and for all that the only global issue of relevance for Jimmy Carter 
was the liberal issue of peace and not the realist concerns of power.  However, again, as 
explained previously, there clearly were reasons for solidifying a Sino-American alliance that had 
little to do with liberal peace and everything to do with the realist global strategies of power 
politics.  It is not really surprising that Carter, the liberal peace-promoting, anti-realist failed to 
mention the elephants in the room—the Soviet Union, the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet 
divergence, which initially prompted the realist strategy. 
 However, the Carter administration’s realist approach to China is evidenced not only by 
the continuation of previous administrations’ realist policies, but also through the National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who, much like a previous notorious National Security 
Advisor—Henry Kissinger—was a realist.  Brzezinski viewed international power structures as a 
zero-sum game in which the United States could only increase its power and security if 
another—namely the Soviet Union—lost power.  His realist paradigm led him to the conclusion 
that the best method for containing Soviet expansion was for the United States to reach out 
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diplomatically to China, a previously staunch Soviet ally.162  Brzezinski’s advice was naturally a 
top priority for the president, who in turn, chose to follow through with diplomatic recognition 
of the People’s Republic of China. 
 One Carter biographer, who discussed the role of human rights and the influence of 
international relations theory on the administration’s policies, was Peter Bourne.  He admits that 
Carter preferred liberal principles in general, but points out that Carter chose to use diplomatic 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China as a method for bending the Soviets to his will 
during the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) negotiations.163  This essentially 
means that Carter preferred liberal internationalism over realpolitik and Bourne explains the liberal 
strategies used in the SALT negotiations, but when that was insufficient to achieve the goal, 
Carter utilized the principles of realpolitik to recognize and cooperate with an illiberal state, 
confirming the prominence of realist strategic reasoning in the decision to diplomatically 
recognize the human rights abusing, undemocratic, freedom suppressing, communist regime of 
the People’s Republic of China.     
Although establishing a diplomatic relationship with China was at face-value a liberal 
act—in line with Carter’s liberal rhetoric—there were also strong realist incentives to do so as 
well and Carter was well aware that using China to pressure the Soviet Union could help him 
achieve his goals.  Carter used the principles of realism to play China against the Soviet Union, 
despite his campaign promises not to engage in realpolitik. 
 
Liberal rhetoric for China; realpolitik for Taiwan 
As has been demonstrated, Carter’s rhetoric regarding the relationship between the United and 
China was highly influenced by liberalism, and at face-value his policies regarding China were as 
well—peace with the world’s most populous state.  It is true that the liberal paradigm of 
international relations theory prescribes the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign 
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leaders and participation in international trade.  However, as the chapter concerning Nixon 
demonstrated, the United States’ relationship with China was also firmly rooted in the principles 
of realism, especially the desire to drive a wedge into the communist bloc.  From this dynamic 
alone, one could conclude that Carter was perhaps both a liberal and a realist in his foreign 
policy management, but a liberal in his rhetoric. 
 However, when the U.S. relationship with Taiwan is taken into consideration, realism 
takes over.  Carter’s establishment of official relations with mainland China was also the 
unilateral termination of U.S. diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), leading 
also to the termination of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty.  This was essentially an 
official betrayal of the U.S. liberal commitment to Taiwan, although the subsequent Taiwan 
Relations Act attempted to counterbalance that by replacing the lost official relations with 
unofficial ones.  Clearly, the Carter administration’s decision to swap U.S. official diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan for those of the mainland was a calculated move, fit for any realist, despite 
the liberal rhetoric. 
 On January 25, 1979, about three and a half weeks after the communiqué was released, 
President Carter delivered his annual State of the Union Address to the United States Congress 
and the general public.  It contained only one paragraph about the U.S. relationships with China 
and Taiwan.   
We are entering a hopeful era in our relations with one-fourth of the world’s people who 
live in China.  The presence of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping next week will help to 
inaugurate that new era.  And with prompt congressional action on authorizing 
legislation, we will continue our commitment to a prosperous, peaceful, and secure life 
for the people of Taiwan.164 
Basically, this small paragraph summarized the previously discussed communiqué and raised the 
same issues as mentioned above: a focus on liberal ideas such as peace and complete disregard 
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for the realist strategy concerning the relative power of the United States, China, Taiwan and the 
Soviet Union.  This showcases once again how President Carter used the rhetoric of the liberal 
paradigm of international relations theories to describe policies heavily formulated with 
inspiration from the realist paradigm of international relations theories. 
 
In the final analysis of President Carter’s policy and rhetoric regarding China, a phenomenon 
typical of U.S. politics is apparent.  As discussed previously, common wisdom would have us 
believe that Nixon and Carter were about as different as possible, including their views on 
foreign policy.  Of course, neither was truly Machiavellian nor truly Kantian, but they 
represented the conceivable ends of the spectrum of electable presidential politicians in the 
United States of America.  However, despite this difference, there was a remarkable continuation 
and stability of the official U.S. policy towards the normalization of diplomatic relations between 
the United States and the People’s Republic of China.  The administrations of both presidents 
participated in high-level diplomatic visits and reached official diplomatic agreements outlining 
the new relationship of international cooperation and global trade.  Also, as discussed 
throughout the previous pages, both presidents downplayed the strategic reasons for 
implementing their policies, as prescribed by the realist paradigm of international relations 
theories; instead, choosing to publicly focus on the peace-promoting aspects from the liberal 
paradigm of international relations theory.  So, both presidents used liberal rhetoric to discuss 
and sell a realist-inspired foreign policy to the public. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
 
U.S. Presidential rhetoric and foreign policy are back in the headlines across the world.  One 
rarely sees direct discussions of the theories of international relations discussed in the media, but 
an understanding of them goes a long way in framing the debate concerning the current military 
action underway in Libya.  The liberal paradigm of international relations theory has greatly 
shaped President Barack Obama’s rhetoric regarding not only the humanitarian mission in Libya 
and the recent democratic revolution in Egypt, but liberalism has also shaped the president’s 
general rhetoric concerning international affairs.  However, liberalism cannot explain everything, 
especially given the lack of presidential leadership concerning the humanitarian crises unfolding 
in Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan, etc.  If the president’s liberal 
rhetoric is insufficient to explain these contemporary foreign policies, then there must be 
another explanation.  The power politics of the U.N. Security Council, the Arab League, NATO 
and the states of the northern Atlantic can better explain why this type of action is unfolding in 
Libya, and not anywhere else.   
Historically, realism has been the key to explaining U.S. foreign policy.  There have 
certainly always been nods to liberalism in presidential rhetoric, but the bottom line has also 
always been realist, as was certainly the case during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Jimmy 
Carter.  As is the case with nearly all historical phenomena, one should ask: Does the historical 
precedent still pertain today?  Or has there been a fundamental break with the past?  The 
answers to these questions could form the foundation for important research in the near future. 
 
The method for sorting it all out 
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How can one explain the interactions between the United States and the global community?  In 
answering such a question, one must first realize that all U.S. foreign policies are implemented 
within a global context; thus, the analysis of U.S. foreign policy should also be placed within a 
global context.  This global dynamic is not unique to the United States, it would be applicable to 
many states’ foreign policies, but small states do not usually have a comparable global impact, 
especially in regards to the great powers.  As the most powerful of the great powers; the foreign 
policies of the U.S. are especially important to the political branch of the field of global studies. 
 With the proper global context in mind, one can then begin to properly study the foreign 
policy of the United States.  The primary explanations for U.S. foreign policy are based upon two 
broad sets of international relations theory: realism and liberalism.  Although the first known 
evidence of the principles of realism comes from the ancient civilizations in Greece, India and 
China, contemporary realism was reborn during the philosophical boom of early modern Europe, 
as best exemplified in the works of Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli.  Realism explains 
that states seek survival in the anarchic global system by accruing power and mastering the great 
global game of power politics, in pursuit of the national interest.   
Like realism, liberalism’s roots extend as far back as the antiquities, where the principles 
of democracy and cooperative organization were implemented.  These proto-liberal ideas were 
also reborn during the Enlightenment in the writings of Adam Smith, John Locke, Hugo Grotius 
and most significantly, Immanuel Kant.  Liberalism claims that global anarchy can be replaced 
with peace and universal human rights through the spread of democracy, international 
organizations and economic interdependence.165 
 Of course, there are other theories used to explain the activities of the global community, 
but realism and liberalism overwhelmingly dominate the discourse.  They are widely studied and 
publicly discussed; they are the intellectual backbone of U.S. foreign policy.  These two 
paradigms of international relations exist because they can both be utilized to explain the 
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diplomatic history of the United States.  The elements of both realism and liberalism help explain 
the American Revolutionary War,  the Monroe Doctrine, the Manifest Destiny, the Mexican-
American War, the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, both World Wars and the 
Cold War.  However, no state can always employ both theories at the same time; many global 
events demonstrate a conflict of interest between the two, and any state that tries to pursue 
both—tries to eat the cake and have it too—will fail in the pursuit of at least one of the 
approaches.  Thus, the great debate of U.S. foreign policy is: realism or liberalism? 
 One of the foremost contemporary international relations theorists (and a realist), John 
Mearsheimer, believes that U.S. and global foreign policies are predominantly based upon the 
principles of realism.  He acknowledges the great appeal of liberalism; its positive outlook and 
strong values are consistent with U.S. values and thus greatly appreciated by the U.S. electorate.  
Liberalism is an explanation of the world that so many U.S. citizens want to believe in, and in 
many cases, liberalism explains why their ancestors came to the New World in the first place.166  
On the other hand, many Americans dislike the ideas of realism, especially its concept of 
perpetual global anarchy and the reliance upon brute force and warfare.  Sometimes it is difficult 
for people to understand why their family members and friends must fight wars in faraway places 
to preserve the global balance of power.  Many people in the U.S. staunchly reject the pursuit of 
global hegemony—the ultimate goal of realism.  But if one is to believe Mearsheimer, the appeal 
of liberalism and the desire for a perpetual peace is not enough to negate the harsh realities of 
realism.167 
 The dichotomy of realism and liberalism in the eyes of the U.S. public manifests itself as 
a foreign policy dichotomy of pursuing the realist national interest and pursing liberal national 
values abroad.  Mearsheimer further explains that this foreign policy dichotomy creates a political 
conundrum for the president of the United States, whose ultimate responsibility is to ensure the 
national security of the U.S. by pursuing the national interest; however, it is the U.S. citizenry 
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which elects the president and the people have largely liberal values.168  If an individual wants to 
be elected president, he or she must typically share the values of the electorate, but to do the job 
effectively, he or she must pursue the national interest.  Thus, Mearsheimer explains, U.S. 
presidents use liberal values in their rhetoric to win elections and maintain their popular support, 
but govern according to the realist interest of the state, which is necessary for success.169 
 Mearsheimer is not alone in observing this discrepancy between presidential rhetoric and 
policy, regarding foreign affairs.  Statesman Dr. Henry Kissinger has also directly acknowledged 
this phenomenon in his book Diplomacy,170 echoing his former boss’s own statements a few years 
earlier.  President Richard Nixon acknowledged this phenomenon as discussed in the conclusion 
of this essay’s third chapter.171  His quotation bears a repeat here: “We should practice power 
politics [or realism] because that’s the way the world is.  But it must be cast in idealistic [liberal] 
terms in order to get people to support it.”172  In this regard, Nixon was a man and president 
who practiced what he preached, and his trip to China was perhaps the most spectacular example.  
It was obvious that Nixon wanted to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, 
dividing the global communist bloc, and thus reducing its threat to the U.S., a vital national 
interest.  However, Nixon rarely, if ever, acknowledged this publicly.  Instead, he spoke about his 
“journey for peace”173 to the world’s most populous state, a far more liberal notion. 
 Reluctantly, President Jimmy Carter later followed in his footsteps.  The unprecedented 
circumstances of the Watergate scandal opened the political door for an unconventional 
politician to ascend to the presidency.  Lacking the more traditional foreign experience, Carter 
turned to his faith to inspire his moral approach to governance, including foreign policy.  
However, he ultimately subverted his liberal orientation of peace and human rights with his 
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desire for success, and a typically realist approach to foreign policy.  After pursuing his human 
rights agenda with the Soviet Union, Carter realized that a realist strategy of further distancing 
Beijing from Moscow via official diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China 
would pressure the Soviets into accepting his proposal to limit strategic arms (SALT II).174 
 
From hypocrisy to ironic consistency 
Despite their location at different ends of the political spectrum in Washington, D.C., both 
Presidents Nixon and Carter shared not only a fundamentally realist approach to foreign policy, 
but also a rhetoric firmly rooted in the principles of liberal internationalism.   
 Once it is clear that realism has been used to formulate the foundation of U.S. foreign 
policy while liberalism is used rhetorically, the frequent hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy becomes 
easily understood.  The policies themselves were not hypocritical, just the manner in which they 
were discussed with the public.  This explains why the U.S. sent its military forces abroad to 
overthrow the imperial Japanese and Nazi regimes, while it accepted the presence and illiberal 
policies—including poignant violations of human rights—in the regimes of Stalin and Pinochet 
among others.  The policies to overthrow some regimes and not others were not based upon 
liberal concerns but rather realist ones.   
Imperial Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor and Nazi Germany had declared war against 
the United States after conquering several U.S. allies in Europe.  They directly threatened the 
national security of the United States, thus, the U.S. policy was to confront them.  On the other 
hand, neither Stalin nor Pinochet directly attacked the U.S., thus the U.S. did not forcefully 
overthrow their regimes.  In fact, both dictators, despite their distasteful policies, could help the 
U.S. pursue its own national interest: Stalin helped to overthrow Hitler, who had been a greater 
threat to the United States.  Pinochet served the U.S. national interest by helping to stop the 
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encroachment of socialism and communism in Latin America, thus his otherwise illiberal policies 
were tolerated.   
The blatant realpolitik of the Cold War may at first glance challenge this concept, but it 
remained cold and not hot because neither side was willing to engage in direct warfare.  The 
United States had a strategic interest in leaving the Soviet Union and Chile alone, but it had a 
strategic incentive to defeat Imperial Japan and Nazi German because of the imminent threat 
they posed.  There is a striking similarity in the foreign policies of the U.S. from the World War, 
Cold War and post-Cold War eras: U.S. presidents used liberal ideas and theory to discuss their 
policies based upon the principles of realpolitik, as was clearly demonstrated by the 
administrations of both Nixon and Carter. 
 
BEYOND THE CASE STUDIES 
Once an understanding of the historical pattern of the discrepancy in U.S. foreign policy 
between liberal rhetoric and realist policy is established, the next logical issue to consider is 
whether or not this trend continues into the present and if it will continue even further into the 
future.  History itself would indicate that endurance of the trend is more likely than demise.  
After all, the discrepancy has existed throughout history.   
This essay only considered two case studies from the Cold War, but, as was mentioned 
above, the early history of the United States of America seems to indicate that the discrepancy 
has always existed.  Most, if not all, major U.S. foreign policies throughout history have had a 
strong connection to liberal values, while also adhering to the realist paradigm of international 
relations theory.   
If the discrepancy between liberalism and realism in U.S. foreign policy could survive 
previous fundamental transitions in global history, then why couldn’t it also survive the breach of 
a despised wall in a distant foreign city? 
 
  
   
 
104 
 
To the East: realism and liberalism 
The fall of the Iron Curtain was a complicated matter, and the United States was out of the loop 
for much of it; however, the United States did play a heavy role in the most important aspect: 
German Reunification.  The administration of U.S. President George H. W. Bush may have been 
caught off-guard when the Berlin Wall was breached, but it certainly did not simply sit back and 
watch the chips falls where they may.175  While British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher began 
taking back her rhetorically liberal support for unification to play the game of realpolitik by 
asking her archrival the Soviet Union to maintain its presence in East Germany to ensure that a 
united German state would not attack Britain for the third time in a century,176 on the other side 
of the Atlantic Ocean, the Bush administration was coming to a different conclusion, one which 
allowed it to credibly maintain its liberal rhetoric.177 
 For the United States, the reunification of Germany was the perfect opportunity to score 
a victory at the expense of the Soviet Union both in terms of liberal and realist global strategy.178  
Concerning liberalism, accession of the East German Länder to the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany) and NATO was a sure method for ensuring the spread of stable democracy, 
capitalism and (friendly) international institutionalism to the former East Germany.  This 
corresponded to the realist national interest and geostrategic goals of the United States because 
German reunification included the expansion of NATO into the crumbling Warsaw Pact and 
strongly showed to the world how weak the Soviet empire had become.  By supporting 
reunification, the Bush administration was able to ensure that the Iron Curtain came down in 
manner consistent with both the liberal and realist interests of the United States, while 
supporting its ally, Europe’s largest nation, achieve a decades-old goal.  The collapse of the 
Berlin Wall created a convenient convergence of realism and liberalism for the United States.  By 
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helping Germany reunite, the U.S. was able to triumph over the Soviet Union and win the Cold 
War in Europe without fighting a battle.179 
 
The initial rise and fall of liberal interventionism 
A quick look further into the 1990’s seems to indicate that an attempt at true liberalization of U.S. 
foreign policy—and a rejection of realism—failed.  Power politics remained the primary impetus.  
The militarized humanitarian mission in Somalia in 1994 was supposed to mark the great 
transition to a truly liberal world order—the U.S. military being used to protect global peace and 
human rights and to advance global liberalism instead of the often violent and manipulative 
realpolitik.  The book and Hollywood movie Black Hawk Down180 present quite clearly why this 
transition was quickly reversed—the mission in Somalia turned out to be a great blunder for the 
U.S. military, as the Somali people turned against the force that was ostensibly attempting to help 
them.  The disaster in Mogadishu so shocked the administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton 
that at the first outbreaks of violence in Rwanda, it quickly pulled its presence out of the country, 
leaving 800,000 people to be slaughtered during the Rwandan Genocide.181 
 Due to their lack of crucial resources and global political clout, neither African state 
played a role in the realist national interest of the United States.  After the liberal humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia notoriously and poignantly failed, the administration abandoned the 
policy prescriptions of the liberal paradigm and reverted back to the realist paradigm, which 
prescribed staying out of the situations lacking a U.S. national interest, including Rwanda. 
 However, liberal rhetoric came back in full force during the U.S. and NATO’s 
involvement in the Kosovo War.  Liberal internationalism clearly influenced the president’s 
rhetoric about ending the ethnic cleansing campaign, preventing genocide and protecting the 
basic human rights of the Kosovar Albanians, who were under attack from Serbian authorities.  
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However, given the geographic location of Kosovo and Serbia in southeastern Europe, there 
were great concerns about the massive flow of refugees destabilizing the region, which included 
key NATO allies.  NATO’s intervention in Kosovo also conveniently allowed NATO to 
demonstrate its relevancy despite the Soviet Union’s collapse while also driving a wedge between 
Serbia and its cultural and political ally Russia.  The involvement of the United States via NATO 
in the Kosovo War is a good example of the marriage between realism and liberalism in U.S. 
foreign policy and a restoration of the foreign policy ironies of the past. 
 
A new U.S. foreign policy? 
The real great debate over the continuation of the discrepancy of liberal rhetoric and realist 
policy concerns U.S. foreign policy after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  To be sure, 
there was a lot of presidential rhetoric about the national security of the United States and its 
citizens, especially regarding the overthrow of the Taliban in the pursuit of al-Qaeda.  This realist 
rhetoric extended to the discourse about Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.  
But there was a lot of liberal rhetoric as well, especially after the initial military victories. 
 Regarding Afghanistan, the liberal rhetoric answered what would replace the Taliban’s 
grossly illiberal rule.  The new liberalism for Afghanistan was to include: human rights, especially 
for women; education, for girls as well as boys; freedom from religious and political suppression; 
and, of course, democracy.  Before the U.S. invasion, Iraq had been a more liberal society than 
Afghanistan, despite the violation of the human rights of minority groups and the lack of 
democracy.  Once the Taliban had been displaced (in Afghanistan) and it became apparent to all 
that there were no weapons of mass destruction (in Iraq), the basis for the realist rhetoric was 
gone, leaving only the liberal rhetoric about equality, freedom, voting and women’s rights to 
justify the initial invasions and unending occupations. 
For both Iraq and Afghanistan it seems at first glance that the old discrepancy was back: 
the administration used liberal rhetoric to justify realist invasions.  However, there is a difference 
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between a policy to launch an invasion and a policy to continue an occupation.  Despite copious 
dissent, President George W. Bush continues to argue that it was in the U.S. national interest to 
overthrow the Afghan and Iraqi regimes,182, 183 but only liberalism can explain the never-ending 
occupations.  Perhaps the most fascinating development of all is that President Barack Obama 
was electorally successful in large part due to his opposition to the war and occupation of Iraq, 
but yet continues to support the same liberal cause (initiated by Bush) to justify the ongoing 
occupation of Afghanistan, for which there is also little realist justification.184  Obama also 
initiated U.S. military action in Libya along with plenty of liberal rhetoric, but no clear national 
interest. 
 In terms of policy, the Iraq War and the ongoing occupation of Afghanistan challenge 
the concept that U.S. foreign policy’s connection to liberalism is based upon rhetoric only, while 
realism drives the actual policy.  Actually, liberalism—in this case a militarized version—does a 
much better job of explaining U.S. foreign policy in the age of the War on Terror.  However, one 
must also realize that not all supporters of liberal internationalism also support militarized liberal 
interventionism.  It is completely logical that many liberals would reject militarized “liberal” 
interventionism because it is ironic that one would advocate using war to create the perpetual 
peace,185 especially after the failure of the “Great War”—the war that failed to end all wars, and 
in fact, actually set the stage for the most brutal war of all. 
 
The new dynamic duo of U.S. foreign policy: neoconservatism and liberal interventionism 
Unlike the liberal humanitarian-based missions in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo—and the mission 
that could-have-been in Rwanda—the “liberal” missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
philosophically more closely related to the neoconservative movement, which is itself a mixture 
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of the realist commitment to preserving the national interest at all costs and the liberal 
commitment to democracy, freedom and human rights.  Could the rise of neoconservative and 
liberal interventionist foreign policy in the United States actually be the turning point that ends 
the long tradition of realist foreign policy cloaked in liberal rhetoric?  This would make for an 
excellent topic of further research. 
 Theoretically, neoconservatism attempts to bridge the gap between realist policy and 
liberal rhetoric by accepting liberalism’s claim that a democratic world would be safer, but then 
using realist strategies to make it happen, by force if necessary.  Neoconservatism quite nicely 
explains the discrepancy between the rhetoric and the policies of the Bush administration’s Iraq 
War and continued occupation of Afghanistan.  One cannot dismiss the realist incentives for the 
U.S. military to enter either of these countries; however, the unending commitment to nation 
building cannot be explained by realism alone as the U.S. continually plunges further into debt 
with China, a quickly rising global power that shares neither the U.S. national interest (realism), 
nor U.S. values (liberalism). 
 Of course, it is also possible that the fad of neoconservatism will follow in the footsteps 
of the fad of liberal interventionism and quickly die out—as it did in the early 1990’s.  However, 
as the United States attempts to conduct yet another regime change, one must consider if this is 
in fact a new era of U.S. foreign policy, quite distinct from the past.  Only time will tell if the U.S. 
will give up the neoconservative doctrine of democratization through force, as it previously gave 
up on humanitarianism through force, which is apparently now back in vogue à la Libya. 
 Although Stephen Walt has written extensively about the division of U.S. foreign policy 
theorists into realist and liberal camps, he has also identified the new dynamic duo of U.S. 
foreign policy: neoconservatism and liberal interventionism.  The realists and the liberals deal 
with theory from a scholarly perspective, while the neoconservatives and liberal interventionists 
combine elements of both realism and liberalism to make public policy prescriptions at think 
tanks and to directly make and implement the policies in positions of power within the 
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government.  Walt has concluded that there is little fundamental difference between the 
neoconservatives and the liberal interventionists because both have similar objectives which they 
attempt to achieve through similar means.  Both combine the most popular elements of realism 
and liberalism.  For Walt, this is the major problem with contemporary U.S. foreign policy, 
which manifests itself in the quagmires of Afghanistan, Iraq and now Libya.  A president 
associated with neoconservatism started the first two, while a president associated with liberal 
interventionism revitalized one and started an additional one.186  Of course, more time and 
evidence are clearly needed, but the relationship between neoconservatism and liberal 
interventionism will undoubtedly be the subject of future studies, as well as their relationship to 
the two dominate theoretical paradigms.  
 Of course, the 21st century did not usher in this new era of U.S. foreign policy; the U.S. 
mission with the United Nations in Somalia in 1993 was also a product of liberal interventionism.  
As mentioned earlier, the fad of liberal interventionism quickly died out, as demonstrated by the 
quick U.S. withdrawal from Rwanda, as the violence escalated.  However, it came back with a 
significant dose of realpolitik during the Kosovo War and remained highly influential throughout 
the following decade alongside its counterpart from across the political aisle, neoconservatism. 
 It is easy to see how Walt is tempted to believe that neoconservative liberal interventionism is 
the new foundation of U.S. foreign policy, but within its latest application in Libya, one can 
clearly see its decline.  In stark contrast to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Obama has 
proclaimed that there will be no U.S. troops sent to Libyan soil.  This indicates his awareness of 
the people’s opposition such action, which he clearly understands since he rode the wave of 
opposition to Bush’s neoconservative liberal interventionism all the way to the Oval Office. 
 Does President Obama’s ambivalent approach to his own neoconservative liberal 
interventionism indicate the true collapse of this new type of foreign policy?   Only time will tell 
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if future policies will be based upon a similarly hobbled together combination of realism and 
liberalism.  However, the realist and liberal paradigms of international relations theory will 
remain relevant.  The recent shift towards neoconservative liberal interventionism is merely a 
reshuffling of realist and liberal ideas; it is a combination of some their most important elements.  
Regardless of how the realist and liberal paradigms are broken down and reassembled, their basic 
ideas remain intact, which means that understanding the basic concepts and how they work 
becomes even more important when trying to comprehend U.S. foreign policy. 
 All recent presidents (and probably all of their predecessors) have had to deal with the 
balance between the realist and liberal paradigms of international relations in their rhetoric and 
policies.  During the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan employed liberal rhetoric about the 
“Evil Empire” to explain to the U.S. public why it needed to confront the world’s other leading 
superpower, the only one that could challenge the U.S. national interest, a primary realist 
concern.  As mentioned above, President George H. W. Bush was able to combine realism and 
liberalism during the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the creation of a new Europe, a 
staunch U.S. ally.  President Bill Clinton turned away from liberal humanitarian interventionism 
after the disaster in Somalia, and only returned to liberal principles and rhetoric when realist 
interests were at stake in the Balkans.  President George W. Bush relied upon liberal rhetoric to 
justify wars that he started in the effort to defend the (realist) national interest as he saw it.  It 
seems that although President Obama has kept the tradition of liberal rhetoric alive, his 
revitalization of the War in Afghanistan and his military action in Libya have eschewed the realist 
policy agenda in favor of militarized liberal interventionism; however, history also indicates that 
the age-old practice of using liberal rhetoric to discuss realist foreign policies is a tough one to 
break.  It is possible—if not probable—that the current and future presidents will come to the 
same conclusions that Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter did when choosing to use liberal 
rhetoric while implementing realist policies. 
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Abstract (English) 
As the United States of America, with the support of an international coalition, begins it’s third 
“military engagement” with a Muslim country in a decade, naturally questions abound 
concerning the motivations of U.S. foreign policy.  Amidst the claims to protect human rights, 
prevent massacres, confiscate weapons of mass destruction and foster stable democracies, are 
the age-old concerns regarding the national security and national interest of the U.S., within the 
great game of power politics.  Undeniably, the global community changed greatly when the 
Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union collapsed leaving the United States as the premier 
global power.  Because the U.S. plays such a significant role in global affairs, an understanding of 
U.S. foreign policy is crucial in understanding many global relations.  But how can one make 
sense of U.S. foreign policy when U.S. presidents claim to be protecting human rights while 
pursuing political agendas such as those to induce regime change?  How can the foreign policy of 
the United States be explained?  One should turn to theory and history for an answer.  The most 
important paradigms of international relations theory in the U.S. are realism and liberalism.  
From the rhetoric of recent and past presidents, it is clear that liberalism is relevant to U.S. 
foreign policy, while the actual policies themselves indicate the importance of realism.  At first 
glance it is not clear, however, which is the most relevant.  An analysis of past presidencies can 
provide a clearer understanding of how the U.S. interacts with the world. 
Although Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter are the standard-bearers of realist 
and liberal foreign policy respectively, a closer analysis reveals that there is a remarkably 
consistent trend.  Despite Nixon’s shrewd efforts of realpolitik, his rhetoric was often quite 
liberal; while, Carter’s obviously liberal rhetoric was often merely a façade for his realist policies.  
This is noteworthy because these two presidents were from opposing political parties, but yet 
demonstrated the same hypocrisy between their rhetoric and policy.  However, one can reconcile 
this hypocrisy through an understanding of democratic politics and the role of public opinion. 
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Abstract (German-Deutsch) 
Als die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika mit Unterstützung einer internationalen Koalition eine 
dritte “militärische Aktion” mit einem muslimischen Land in einem Jahrzehnt begann, sind viele 
Fragen über die Motivation der US-Außenpolitik aufgetreten. Inmitten der Ansprüche 
Menschenrechte zu schützen, Massaker zu verhindern, Massenvernichtungswaffen zu 
beschlagnahmen und Demokratie zu pflegen sind die uralten Sorgen bezüglich der nationalen 
Sicherheit und der Staatsräson der USA, innerhalb des großen Spiels der Machtpolitik, wieder 
aktuell. Unbestreitbar veränderten der Fall der Berliner Mauer und der Zusammenbruch der 
Sowjetunion die globale Gemeinschaft stark, da die USA als die führende Weltmacht übrigblieb.  
Weil die USA eine so herausragende Rolle in globalen Beziehungen spielt, ist ein Verständnis der 
US-Außenpolitik entscheidend, um die globalen Vorgänge in der Welt zu verstehen.  Aber wie 
macht die Außenpolitik der USA Sinn, wenn die US-Präsidenten einerseits erklären 
Menschenrechte schützen zu wollen, andererseits eine Politik verfolgen die auch zu 
Regimewechsel führt. Wie kann man die Außenpolitik der USA erklären?  Für eine Antwort 
sollte man die Geschichte und Theorien befragen. Die wichtigsten Paradigmen der 
„International Relations-Theory“ der USA sind Realismus und Liberalismus. Von der Rhetorik 
der letzten aber auch der früheren Präsidenten zu schließen, ist es klar, dass Liberalismus für die 
US-Außenpolitik relevant ist, während die tatsächliche Politik die Wichtigkeit des Realismus 
aufzeigt. Auf den ersten Blick ist es trotzdem nicht klar welche Theorie am relevantesten ist.  
Eine Analyse der vergangenen Präsidentschaften kann ein klareres Bild darüber erzeugen, wie die 
USA mit der Welt interagiert.   
Obwohl die Präsidenten Richard Nixon und Jimmy Carter als Befürworter von 
Realismus und Liberalismus in der US-Außenpolitik stehen, enthüllt eine genauere Analyse, dass 
es bemerkenswerte Übereinstimmungen gibt. Trotz Nixons gefinkelter Realpolitik, war seine 
Rhetorik oft doch sehr liberal. Während Carters offensichtlich liberale Rhetorik oft nur eine 
Fassade seiner Realpolitik war. Dies ist insofern bemerkenswert, weil diese zwei Präsidenten 
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unterschiedlichen Parteien angehörten, aber bei beiden ein Unterschied zwischen Politik und 
Rhetorik festzumachen ist, welcher auch als scheinheilig beschrieben werden kann. Man kann 
diese Heuchelei durch ein Verstehen von demokratischer Politik und der Rolle der öffentlichen 
Meinung in Einklang bringen. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
119 
 
JOSEPH STEFF  
 
Contact                                                              Address                                                                  Birth 
0680 307 4772                                           Gymnasiumstraße 85                                    September 3, 1984 
steff.joseph@gmail.com                            1190 Vienna, Austria                            Erie, Pennsylvania, USA 
 
EDUCATION 
M. A. Global Studies, Erasmus Mundus: Global Studies – A European Perspective 
Dual degree from the Universities of Leipzig (Germany) and Vienna (Austria)  
 Thesis topic:  international relations theory and the discrepancy of U.S. foreign policy rhetoric 
B. A. International Studies, May 2007 
Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, USA 
 Dickinson-in-Bremen, one-year study abroad program in Germany, September 2005-July 2006 
 Sigma Iota Rho, the National Honor Society for International Studies 
EXPERIENCE 
HIT Izmir, International Education Consultancy (Izmir, Turkey)  
Administrative Assistant Intern/Trainee , August 2008-September 2008 
 Assisted students in their pursuit of an education abroad by helping them choose 
institutions to which to apply. Edited resumes, statements of purpose, personal 
essays, reference letters and various other documents. Communicated with 
admissions personnel and housing providers.  Aided students ’ search for housing, 
employment and internships. Assisted students in making travel and orientation 
arrangements. Created, organized and managed new and existing client portfolios.  
The Clarke Forum for Contemporary Issues, Dickinson College 
Website Administrator, February 2007-May 2007 
 Administered a website. Consolidated, reorganized, edited and updated content.  
Microcosm, Dickinson College Yearbook 
Editor-in-Chief, September 2004-May 2005 
 Administered the design and production of the 2005 yearbook. Re-organized and 
consolidated the sections of the book to allow for an all -color production for the 
first time. Managed the staff and edited (and/or wrote) all text. Designed the layouts. 
Conducted the sale of the previous year’s yearbooks. Cooperated with representatives 
from the production company to ensure a satisfactory production. 
Organizations Editor, September 2003-May 2004 
 Edited and managed the Organizations section of the yearbook.  Collected 
photographs and wrote text.  Finished the book at year’s end, filling in all missing 
pieces and prepared the book for final publication. 
Dickinson College Waidner-Spahr Library 
Information Commons, Desk Attendant , Sept. 2004-May 2005 and Sept.-Dec. 2006 
 Assisted patrons’ use of the library’s electronic equipment, including the computers, 
scanners, printers, photo-copying machines and micro-film readers. Answered 
patrons’ questions regarding the library, its locations, resources and policies.  
Student Worker for the Periodicals Department , September-December 2004 
 Checked-in newly arrived periodicals and placed them in their proper locations.  
Collected old periodicals and prepared them for archival processing . 
 
